



# Big Oil's Political Reach

MAPPING FOSSIL FUEL LOBBYING FROM HARPER TO TRUDEAU

By **Nicolas Graham, William K. Carroll & David Chen**

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**CORPORATE**  
MAPPING PROJECT

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November 2019

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For more information, visit [www.corporatemapping.ca](http://www.corporatemapping.ca).



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# Summary

THIS STUDY PROVIDES A NETWORK ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LOBBYING by the fossil fuel industry in Canada over a seven-year period from 2011 to 2018. The period studied allows for a comparison of lobbying patterns under the Conservative government of Stephen Harper and the Liberal government of Justin Trudeau. The network this research uncovers amounts to a small world of intense interaction among relatively few lobbyists and the designated public office holders who are their targets. In comparing lobbying across the Harper and Trudeau administrations, we find a pattern of continuity-in-change: under Trudeau, the bulk of lobbying was carried out by the same large firms as under Harper while the focus of the lobbying network was concentrated on fewer state agencies. The study also examines the timing and intensity of lobbying across the sector and among select firms to the formation of important policy frameworks and in relation to specific projects such as pipeline proposals and decisions. We argue that the strategic, organized and sustained lobbying efforts of the fossil fuel sector help to explain the past and continuing close coupling of federal policy to the needs of the fossil fuel industry.

The lobbying period under examination coincides with a period during which climate change was acknowledged as an increasingly urgent threat and one in which the Canadian economy became focused significantly around carbon intensive resources.

## Lobbying and the fossil fuel sector

This study looked at contacts registered with the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada and focuses on contacts made by the oil and gas industry. In Canada, the oil and gas industry dominates the lobbying agenda and within that sector lobbying activity is revealed to be concentrated in a handful of corporations and industry associations.

The lobbying period under examination coincides with a period during which climate change was acknowledged as an increasingly urgent threat and one in which the Canadian economy became focused significantly around carbon intensive resources. Also notable is that during this period, after several years of inaction on the file, the Liberal government pledged to adhere to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which requires free, prior and informed consent for projects affecting their lands or territories and other resources.

Past empirical studies, cited in our research, show that lobbying increases when salient policy issues arise or when there are big stakes for organized interests. Our research demonstrates intensified lobbying by the fossil fuel sector, showing, for example, an increase in lobbying by the industry during the 2011–12 period when the Harper government made sweeping changes to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act.

The research looks at the two ends of the lobbying relationship: the fossil fuel firms (and industry associations) doing the lobbying and their targets within the state.

To track lobbying within the fossil fuel sector, we began with 260 organizations: the 239 fossil fuel companies based in Canada with assets of at least \$50 million and 21 carbon-sector industry associations. Of these, 32 companies and 14 industry associations were found in the Canadian Registry of Lobbyists. Examining the full seven-year period from January 4, 2011 to January 30, 2018, we found that:

- The fossil fuel industry in Canada recorded 11,452 lobbying contacts with government officials.
- When compared to other resource industry groups, including the forestry, automotive and renewable energy industries, fossil fuel industry associations are far more active in lobbying activity. The fossil fuel industry also lobbied the federal government at rates five times higher than environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs).
- Lobbying is highly concentrated among large fossil fuel firms and key industry associations with 20 organizations accounting for 88 per cent of the total lobbying contacts by the industry and the other contacts spread among 26 less active organizations.
- The leading lobbyists during this period were the Mining Association of Canada (MAC) and the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP), which contributed 1,596 and 1,268 contacts respectively, comprising a quarter of the total contacts. Both MAC and CAPP represent prominent fossil fuel firms.
- The four most active industry associations under both administrations are MAC, CAPP, the Canadian Energy Pipeline Association and the Canadian Gas Association, each of which represents very large corporations. Together they account for 76.8 per cent of all lobbying by 14 industry groups over the time period studied.

The research looks at the two ends of the lobbying relationship: the fossil fuel firms (and industry associations) doing the lobbying and their targets within the state.

## A troubling shift in lobbying patterns

To enable a further comparative analysis across the Harper and Trudeau administrations, the data are divided into two parts with the dividing point at November 4, 2015 when Trudeau's government took office. While the federal government was lobbied by the fossil fuel industry at similar rates across both the Harper and Trudeau administrations, a shift in the pattern of lobbying emerges when the two administrations are compared. Under Harper, we find a large number of contacts between lobbyists and elected officials, who were the most lobbied category when compared to senior public servants and mid-level government staff. Once Trudeau was elected, however, the focus of lobbying shifted away from parliamentarians and toward senior public servants or mid-level staff.

With the shift to Trudeau's government, senior government bureaucrats became the targets of extensive lobbying and at an increased rate when compared to the previous four years of this study. This pattern of shifting focus points toward a "deep state" whereby key government institutions and actors become integrated with private firms and interest groups that together co-produce regulation and policy. This pattern is concerning as it indicates that the influence of industry actors—like those in the fossil fuel sector—are likely to far outlast election cycles and potentially the stated platforms of elected officials and may undermine processes for meaningful consultation with First Nations peoples.

Our research found:

- In the Harper years, high volume lobbying activity was focused on Natural Resources Canada, the House of Commons and, to a lesser extent, Environment Canada, Foreign Affairs, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, and the Prime Minister's Office. CAPP, MAC, TransCanada Corporation and several other firms maintained high-volume lobbying relationships with core state organizations during this period.
- Under Trudeau, high-volume lobbying relations continued to target Natural Resources Canada, the House of Commons and Environment Canada.
- Among the top 10 senior government bureaucrats who remained in their positions after the change in government, their annual contacts with the fossil fuel industry rose from an average of 144.5 contacts under Harper to 228.5 under the Trudeau government.
- Across both time periods we find a network core of a small world of leading industry associations and targeted offices and individuals within government that are in regular contact with each other.

## Recommendations

While it is not possible to determine with certainty the extent to which lobbying by any one group or sector directly influences public policy outcomes, industry continues to find value in employing lobbyists to exert continual pressure on decision-makers to develop policies that align with their interests.

It is important to note that while lobbying can serve the public interest, the financial resources available to the fossil fuel industry seem to put those actors at a distinct advantage in the system as it is currently designed. Changes in the regulation and conduct of lobbying are needed to ensure that lobbying better serves the public's interest.

The current federal Registry of Lobbyists does not require lobbyists to provide detailed information about their communications with state officials and there is a lack of detailed description in the current registry of the nature of meetings held. Additionally, the names of the individual lobbyists involved in meetings and the full disclosure of the costs of lobbying should be reported. Changes that enhance transparency in lobbying are necessary to help ensure that lobbying activities do not overly exert influence on government policy.

Transparency, while needed, will not be enough to level the playing field in a landscape with very powerful players like those representing big oil. Policies that would proactively support more equal access to political influence are needed to ensure industry is not over-represented when shaping policy. This could be accomplished through increased support for public interest or public advocacy lobbying by way of a model similar to that in place in British Columbia where the BC Office of the Seniors Advocate represents the interests of British Columbia seniors on issues of health care, housing, income, independence, transportation and mobility. Advocacy offices with similar powers could be created to address a range of major issues that matter to Canadians and would help even the balance of power that currently heavily favours corporations as we have clearly shown is the case for the fossil fuel sector.

In this time of climate crisis, transitioning away from fossil fuels in a rapid, democratic and socially just manner is required. If we do not acknowledge and address the influence that the fossil fuel industry holds over government policy, we will not be able to take the steps necessary to adequately address the crisis with the urgency it requires.

Industry continues to find value in employing lobbyists to exert continual pressure on decision-makers to develop policies that align with their interests.

# Introduction

Over the seven-year period, we found 11,452 lobbying contacts with government officials registered with the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada. This amounts to just over six contacts per working day.

ON JANUARY 26, 2012, MONTHS BEFORE A BILL was first tabled in Parliament, the Canadian Energy Pipeline Association lobbied high ranking officials at the Ministry of Environment concerning pending amendments to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act. An internal briefing note prepared for then-environment minister Peter Kent, released through access to information legislation, highlighted the department's role in assessing pipelines linking Alberta's oil sands industry to British Columbia's coast (such as Enbridge's Northern Gateway) and recommended that Kent and his colleagues assure the industry association that oil, gas and pipeline companies would be "top-of-mind" in the changes to the laws.<sup>1</sup> Subsequent changes to the Act, which came into force in summer 2012, have meant that approximately 90 per cent of major industrial projects that would previously have undergone federal environmental review no longer do.<sup>2</sup>

This meeting is but one salient example of a troublingly close relationship between the fossil fuel industry and the federal government and provides insight into the process of political lobbying, through which industry seeks to forge and maintain close relationships with public office holders and advance corporate interests by influencing the policy planning process. This report provides a comprehensive analysis of federal lobbying in Canada by the fossil fuel industry by examining lobbying by oil, gas and coal corporations and their industry associations over a seven-year period from January 4, 2011 to January 30, 2018. This time period enables a comparative analysis of lobbying under the Conservative government of Stephen Harper (from January 2011 to November 2015) and the Liberal government of Justin Trudeau (from November 2015 to January 2018). Our study analyses the political strategies, reach and influence of carbon capital in Canada across two successive federal administrations.

Over the seven-year period, we found 11,452 lobbying contacts with government officials registered with the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada. This amounts to just over six contacts per working day. Oil and gas industry associations, which are central to the network of lobbyists, are far more active in lobbying federally than other resource and manufacturing associations. The amount of lobbying by environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOS) pales in comparison. Within the fossil fuel sector, lobbying is dominated by a handful of corporations and industry associations. These organizations, which control much of the economic

1 Mike de Souza, "Pipeline development was 'top of mind' in Stephen Harper's budget bill, say 'secret' records," Canada.com, September 28, 2012, <https://o.canada.com/uncategorized/pipeline-development-was-top-of-mind-in-budget-bill-says-secret-records>.

2 Johnston, "Canada's Track Record on Environmental Laws 2011–2015."



sector, maintain a steady presence in the halls of government and exert continual pressure on, or work in tandem with, key public officials to develop policies that align with their efforts to advance their interests.<sup>3</sup>

While there is a high degree of continuity in the lobby network, we observe some changes in lobbying patterns across the two administrations. Among them is the diminished role of Members of Parliament as a focal governmental target under Trudeau and the growing significance of senior public servants and mid-level staff. This points to the targeting of key decision makers and state actors that remained after the change of government. We also connect the timing and intensity of lobbying across the sector and among select firms to the formation of important policy frameworks such as the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act and in relation to specific projects such as the Northern Gateway Pipeline and Trans Mountain Pipeline Expansion (TMX). We argue that the strategic, organized and sustained lobbying efforts of the fossil fuel sector help to explain the past and continuing close coupling of federal policy to the needs of extractive corporations.

Our study begins with a discussion of recent fossil fuel development in Canada and its challenges, followed by a brief overview of governmental policy frameworks surrounding carbon extractive development during the years examined. We then analyze the data, starting with a focus on the two ends of the lobbying chain—the fossil fuel firms (and industry associations) and their state targets. We consider how this chain has evolved over time, while also comparing lobbying carried out by ENGOs and non-fossil-fuel industry associations. Next, through a network analysis, we provide comprehensive mapping of lobbying relations between big oil, their registered lobbyists, the targeted public office holders and the state institutions they represent. After mapping the network, we hone in on specific “lobbying windows,” considering the timing and intensity of lobbying in relation to important policy frameworks and large-scale project proposals and decisions.

Fossil fuel organizations maintain a steady presence in the halls of government and exert continual pressure on, or work in tandem with, key public officials to develop policies that align with their efforts to advance their interests.

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3 Under the federal Lobbying Act, meetings and communications initiated by public officials with corporations, industry groups and NGOs are reported as lobbying. Lobbying relationships are therefore not unidirectional; well-organized corporations (and their industry associations) exert pressure on decision-makers through lobbying, yet government may also convene meetings with industry representatives.

# Canada's oil and gas boom

Fossil fuel production is highly capital-intensive, meaning that employment in the sector is slight in relation to other industrial sectors and relative to output and emissions.

THE SCIENTIFIC CONSENSUS HOLDS THAT TO REMAIN within 1.5 to 2 degrees of warming and thus avoid catastrophic climate change, a rapid shift away from fossil fuels is required within the next two decades. However, in the same period during which the climate crisis has become an urgent threat, the Canadian economy has come to be focused significantly around carbon extractive development. Indeed, the boom in unconventional fossil fuels—especially bitumen from the Alberta tar sands and fracked shale gas—has precipitated changes to the structure and composition of the Canadian economy, steadily elevating the importance of hydrocarbon resource extraction as a core industry.<sup>4</sup> By 2010, Alberta had eclipsed Ontario as the province with the largest share of the nation's capital stock and by 2013 mining and oil and gas extraction claimed the largest share of that capital stock (21.73 per cent).<sup>5</sup> In early 2014, at the peak of the oil boom, the extractive sector accounted for nearly 25 per cent of private investment, up from less than 5 per cent in the early 1990s.<sup>6</sup>

Recent political economy and political ecology approaches have raised concerns regarding the long-run political-economic implications and path dependencies associated with fossil fuel development.<sup>7</sup> Drawing from work on “rentierism” and staples theory, heavy reliance on hydrocarbon exports is argued to pose a series of economic challenges that often produce a “resource curse,” or a “staples trap.”<sup>8</sup> The literature finds that reliance on oil exports often leads to revenue unpredictability, while also undermining efforts to diversify the economy's productive base. This is evident in Canada, which has experienced a version of the “Dutch disease,” whereby the effects of the unconventional oil and gas boom have caused an inflated dollar, leading to a decline in manufacturing and other export sectors.<sup>9</sup> Importantly, fossil fuel production is highly capital-intensive,

4 Carroll, “Canada's Carbon-Capital Elite”; MacNeil, “The Decline of Canadian Environmental Regulation.”

5 McCormack, Workman and McNally, *The Servant State*.

6 Eric Pineault, “Welcome to the Age of Extractivism and Extreme Oil: Éric Pineault,” *National Observer*, May 18, 2016, <http://www.nationalobserver.com/2016/05/18/opinion/welcome-age-extractivism-and-extreme-oil-%C3%A9ric-pineault>.

7 Adkin, *First World Petro-Politics*; Carter, “Petro-Capitalism and the Tar Sands”; Carter and Zalik, “Fossil Capitalism and the Rentier State: Toward a Political Ecology of Alberta's Oil Economy”; Nikiforuk, *Tar Sands: Dirty Oil and the Future of a Continent*.

8 Haley, “The Staple Theory and the Carbon Trap”; Pineault, “The Panacea: Panax Quinquifolius and the Mirage of the Extractive Economy”; Shrivastava, “Liberal Democracy in Oil-Exporting Countries: A View from the Perspective of Staples Theory”; Watkins, *Staples and Beyond*.

9 Laxer, *After the Sands*.

meaning that employment in the sector is slight in relation to other industrial sectors and relative to output and emissions.<sup>10</sup>

Structural dependence on fossil fuel revenues (combined with distinctive political-institutional configurations and policies)<sup>11</sup> has also been found to produce negative political impacts. In the Alberta context, research points to a cumulative deterioration of the link between the state and citizens as oil rents release the state from reliance on tax revenue, contributing to its privileging of corporate interests over democracy and environmental sustainability.<sup>12</sup> A resource-extractive economy driven by short-term profit-making produces frequent clashes with First Nations rights and title,<sup>13</sup> while First Nations and other communities in extractive zones and downstream suffer often devastating environmental effects from fossil fuel development.<sup>14</sup>

States or regions suffering from a resource curse may also experience a “carbon trap,” or policy deterioration due to the “institutional molding effects” of oil revenue dependency.<sup>15</sup> Here, government reliance on oil rents is argued to obstruct progress on carbon emissions reduction and environmentally progressive policies, making future climate adaptation all the more difficult.<sup>16</sup>

Work examining the political inertia that characterizes fossil fuel dependent economies is complemented by recent literature that combines the sociology of corporate power with the political economy and ecology of fossil capitalism.<sup>17</sup> This research demonstrates that where carbon extraction comprises a leading sector, corporate power invests deeply in maintaining conditions for the accumulation of fossil capital.

A resource-extractive economy driven by short-term profit-making produces frequent clashes with First Nations rights and title, while First Nations and other communities in extractive zones and downstream suffer often devastating environmental effects from fossil fuel development.

10 Albo and Yap, “From the Tar Sands to “Green Jobs”? Work and Ecological Justice.”

11 While pointing to reliance on oil revenue as an explanation for “democratic deficits,” the authors cited here recognize the crucial importance of policy and governance directions in “petro-state” formation. They point to the need to avoid undue focus on the commodity of oil itself, in favour of more complex explanations that include a focus on royalty and taxation regimes, as well as public ownership frameworks in accounting for state-society relations (see especially Carter, “The Petro-Politics of Environmental Regulation in the Tar Sands”; Shrivastava, “Liberal Democracy in Oil-Exporting Countries: A View from the Perspective of Staples Theory.” Studies here often point to Norway’s success in overcoming some of the challenges of resource revenue dependence, citing the political-institutional context undergirding the government’s ability to reap economic and political benefits and achieve comparatively better environmental records (Ibid).

12 Adkin, “Democracy and The Albertan Petro-State”; Carter and Zalik, “Fossil Capitalism and the Rentier State: Toward a Political Ecology of Alberta’s Oil Economy”; Shrivastava, “Liberal Democracy in Oil-Exporting Countries: A View from the Perspective of Staples Theory.”

13 Adkin and Stendie, “In the Path of the Pipeline: Environmental Citizenship, Aboriginal Rights, and the Northern Gateway Pipeline Review”; Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*; Manno, Hirsch, and Feldpausch-Parker, “Introduction by the Onondaga Nation and Activist Neighbors of an Indigenous Perspective on Issues Surrounding Hydrofracking in the Marcellus Shale”; Thomas-Muller, “The Rise of the Native Rights-Based Strategic Framework.”

14 Flanagan and Grant, “Losing Ground: Why the Problem of Oilsands Tailings Waste Keeps Growing”; Grant, Angen, and Dyer, “Forecasting the Impacts of Oilsands Expansion: Measuring the Land Disturbance, Air Quality, Water Use, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and Tailings Production Associated with Each Barrel of Bitumen Flanagan and Grant, “Losing Ground: Why the Problem of Oilsands Tailings Waste Keeps Growing”; Grant, Angen, and Dyer, “Forecasting the Impacts of Oilsands Expansion: Measuring the Land Disturbance, Air Quality, Water Use, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and Tailings Production Associated with Each Barrel of Bitumen Production”; Hansen, Mulvaney, and Betcher, “Water Resource Reporting and Water Footprint from Marcellus Shale Development in West Virginia and Pennsylvania.”

15 Carter, “Petro-Capitalism and the Tar Sands.”

16 Adkin, *First World Petro-Politics*; Carter, “Petro-Capitalism and the Tar Sands”; Carter and Zalik, “Fossil Capitalism and the Rentier State: Toward a Political Ecology of Alberta’s Oil Economy”; Nikiforuk, *Tar Sands: Dirty Oil and the Future of a Continent*.

17 Carroll et al., “The Corporate Elite and the Architecture of Climate Change Denial”; Carroll, “Canada’s Carbon-Capital Elite”; Adkin et al., “Can Public Engagement Democratize Environmental Policymaking in a Resource-Dependent State?”; Carter and Zalik, “Fossil Capitalism and the Rentier State: Toward a Political Ecology of Alberta’s Oil Economy”; Graham, “State-Capital Nexus and the Making of BC Shale and Liquefied Natural Gas”; Carroll, *Regime of Obstruction: How Corporate Power Blocks Energy Democracy*.

Studies have traced the reach of carbon capital into political and civil society and at regional, national and international scales. The power of the sector reaches into civil society as carbon-capital factions and their allies participate in the governance and funding of organizations such as policy-planning groups, think tanks, and media outlets<sup>18</sup> as well as research institutes and universities).<sup>19</sup> In the political field, a growing body of research has focused on corporate lobbying<sup>20</sup> as well as political party donations<sup>21</sup> and “revolving door” relations or close personal ties between the corporate community and the state apparatus.<sup>22</sup>

We draw from this research while focusing on one important vector of influence—political lobbying at the federal level in Canada. Our examination of lobbying over a seven-year period, from January 4, 2011 to January 30, 2018, affords a close comparison of the latter years of the Harper and early years of the Trudeau administrations.

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- 18 Bonds, “Beyond Denialism”; Brulle, “Institutionalizing Delay”; Elsner and Kasper, “Attacks on Renewable Energy Policies in 2015”; Carroll et al., “The Corporate Elite and the Architecture of Climate Change Denial.”
- 19 Adkin and Stares, “Turning Up the Heat: Hegemonic Politics in a First World Petro State”; Carroll, Graham, and Yunker, “Carbon Capital and Corporate Influence: Mapping Elite Networks of Corporations, Universities, and Research Institutes”; Gustafson, “Fossil Knowledge Networks: Industry Strategy, Public Culture, and the Challenge for Critical Research.”
- 20 Carter, “The Petro-Politics of Environmental Regulation in the Tar Sands”; Elsner and Kasper, “Attacks on Renewable Energy Policies in 2015”; Graham, “State-Capital Nexus and the Making of BC Shale and Liquefied Natural Gas”; Graham, Daub, and Carroll, “Mapping Political Influence”; Klein, *This Changes Everything*.
- 21 Graham, “State-Capital Nexus and the Making of BC Shale and Liquefied Natural Gas”; Graham, Daub, and Carroll, “Mapping Political Influence.”
- 22 Adkin and Miller, “Alberta, Fossil Capitalism, and the Political Ecology of Change”; Apeldoorn and Graaff, “The Limits of Open Door Imperialism and the US State-Capital Nexus”; de Graaff, “The Hybridization of the State-Capital Nexus in the Global Energy Order”; de Graaff and Apeldoorn, “US Elite Power and the Rise of ‘Statist’ Chinese Elites in Global Markets”; Taft, *Oil’s Deep State*.

# Canadian fossil fuel capitalism and government policy: Harper and Trudeau administrations

FORMER PRIME MINISTER STEPHEN HARPER WAS FORTHRIGHT in linking Canada's prosperity to its emergence as an "energy superpower."<sup>23</sup> Under his administration we subsequently witnessed a spate of new federal regulatory rollbacks and the formation of policy frameworks aimed at facilitating oil and gas development and other resource extraction.<sup>24</sup> Most notably, amendments in 2012 to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA-2012) eliminated much of the core of federal-level environmental assessment in Canada.<sup>25</sup> In practice, the changes have meant that approximately 90 per cent of major industrial projects that would previously have undergone federal environmental review no longer do.<sup>26</sup> In the case of large pipeline and energy infrastructure projects that cross provincial and international borders, the 2012 changes transferred responsibility for environmental assessments from the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA) to the National Energy Board (NEB), which must also conduct its own "national interest" assessment.

The election of the Trudeau Liberals in 2015 appeared to portend a more circumspect approach to carbon extractive development, including the likelihood of tougher environmental regulations on industry and a serious commitment to achieving climate targets. During the 2015 election campaign, the Liberals promised to "modernize" the NEB and the environmental regulatory

23 Fekete, Jason. "Harper in China: PM Attacks 'foreign Money' behind Oil Sands Protest, Refuses to Trade Human Rights," *National Post*, February 10, 2012, <http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/stephen-harper-pushes-for-responsible-oil-and-gas-trade-in-china-speech>.

24 Carter, "Petro-Capitalism and the Tar Sands"; Gibson, "In Full Retreat"; MacNeil, "The Decline of Canadian Environmental Regulation."

25 Gibson, "In Full Retreat."

26 Johnston, "Canada's Track Record on Environmental Laws 2011–2015."

process as a whole in order to restore credibility to the review process.<sup>27</sup> Along with changes to environmental reviews, Trudeau actively campaigned on a shift away from the Harper government's derisive model of consultation with First Nations on resource development. After years of Conservative inaction on the file, the new Liberal federal government pledged to adhere to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which requires free, prior and informed consent for projects affecting their lands or territories and other resources.<sup>28</sup>

Following his assumption of office in 2015 and in advance of the United Nations climate change conference COP 21 in Paris, Prime Minister Trudeau further announced that:

*Canada looks forward to playing a constructive role at COP 21...We have an opportunity to make history in Paris—an agreement that supports a transition to a low-carbon economy that is necessary for our collective health, security, and prosperity. Canada is back, my good friends.*<sup>29</sup>

Federal policy continues to move away from the commitments made in Paris, while Indigenous rights and title are disregarded in favour of fossil fuel development.

The later ratification of the Paris Agreement in 2016 appeared to confirm this change of direction on climate policy as Canada committed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 30 per cent below 2005 levels by 2030.

Yet federal policy continues to move away from the commitments made in Paris,<sup>30</sup> while Indigenous rights and title are disregarded in favour of fossil fuel development. Trudeau's 2016 Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change offers a policy of slow domestic and market-based energy transition to be funded by expanding capacity for bitumen production and transport in the medium term alongside taxing those same resources when used domestically. Within this framework, the government has approved and actively championed new pipelines such as the Trans Mountain Expansion Project despite lacking consent of affected Indigenous communities and clear evidence that the pipeline is at odds with Canada's commitment to lower its greenhouse gas emissions. Indeed, by 2017, Trudeau was singing a different tune on fossil fuel development, asserting that "No country would find 173 billion barrels of oil in the ground and just leave them there. The resource will be developed."<sup>31</sup>

We argue that lobbying is an important method of corporate political influence and that the sustained lobbying efforts of the fossil fuel sector help to explain the tight coupling between federal government policy and the needs of extractive corporations. Before moving to our findings, in the next section we provide a brief literature review on the lobbying process.

27 John Paul Tasker, "New rules will affect projects like Energy East and Trans Mountain, which are before National Energy Board," CBC News, January 27, 2016, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/environmental-regulations-pipelines-1.3422129>.

28 James Wilt, "Six More Broken Liberal Promises," The Tyee, February 14, 2017, <https://thetyee.ca/Opinion/2017/02/14/Broken-Liberal-Promises/>.

29 Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, speaking at the UN Paris climate talks on November 30, 2015.

30 Hughes, "Can Canada Expand Oil and Gas Production, Build Pipelines and Keep Its Climate Change Commitments?"; Hughes, "Canada's Energy Outlook"; Lee, "Extracted Carbon."

31 Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, speaking at the CERAWEEK Global Energy and Environment Leadership Award Dinner in Houston, Texas on Thursday March 9, 2017.

# Lobbying: What it is, what it seeks to accomplish, who does it and when

IN BROAD TERMS, THE GOAL OF LOBBYING by private firms is to promote policies that increase the potential for making profit while blocking policies and regulations that impede an organization's interests. Canada's federal Lobbying Act defines lobbying as "communicating, with public office holders, for payment with regard to: the making, developing or amending of federal legislative proposals, bills or resolutions, regulations, policies or programs; the awarding of federal grants, contributions or other financial benefits; and the awarding of a federal government contract."<sup>32</sup>

As this description suggests, lobbying may be trained on narrow and immediate pursuits such as obtaining government grants, licences and access to resources. Through lobbying, firms provide governments with updates on their activities while also conveying preferences, commitments and threats or some combination thereof.<sup>33</sup> Lobbying is also aimed at shaping and influencing the policy planning process and this involves a host of sophisticated techniques and strategies. As Brulle<sup>34</sup> suggests, lobbyists and lobbying firms engage in extensive monitoring activities surrounding both minor regulatory changes and broad policy issues. They subsequently provide state officials with information, statistics, forecasts, background materials, policy briefs and reports in an effort to advance their interests surrounding policy.

In this process, influencing and controlling a decision maker's *perceptions* of an issue is central. Indeed, as Drutman<sup>35</sup> argues, to influence the decision-making process, lobbyists aim not only to transfer information on a given regulatory process or policy issue, but endeavor more broadly to "saturate" the intellectual environment, to overwhelm policy makers with information and argumentation on one

Through lobbying, firms provide governments with updates on their activities while also conveying preferences, commitments and threats or some combination thereof.

32 Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada, "Frequently asked questions," <https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/eic/site/012.nsf/eng/00884.html>.

33 de Figueiredo and Richter, "Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying."

34 Brulle, "The Climate Lobby."

35 Drutman, *The Business of America Is Lobbying*.

Greater levels of lobbying lead to lower taxation rates, relaxed regulatory oversight, reduced environmental regulations, increased likelihood of government bailouts, more government contracts and higher overall financial performance, for the lobbying firms.

side of an issue while “framing out” competing or alternative conceptions.<sup>36</sup> Along with efforts to control the understanding of an issue through the dissemination of information, lobbyists seek to simultaneously construct stable and long-term relationships with decision makers through repeated interaction and communication.<sup>37</sup> Lobbyists, therefore, work to be viewed as reliable allies whose knowledge and expertise is trusted and whose arguments and frames ultimately come to mind more quickly than others when it comes time to construct policy or make a decision.

It is difficult to establish the effectiveness or direct “payoffs” of lobbying. Recent broad level and comparative studies have shown, however, that greater levels of lobbying lead to lower taxation rates,<sup>38</sup> relaxed regulatory oversight,<sup>39</sup> reduced environmental regulations,<sup>40</sup> increased likelihood of government bailouts,<sup>41</sup> more government contracts<sup>42</sup> and higher overall financial performance,<sup>43</sup> for the lobbying firms. In addition to these indicators, numerous US-based studies (where lobbying expenditures data are available) have documented the high levels of corporate spending on lobbying,<sup>44</sup> including in the area of climate policy.<sup>45</sup> This is a further indication that corporations consider lobbying to be a valuable component of their overall business strategies.

In terms of who lobbies, evidence shows that corporations and their affiliated industry associations account for the vast majority of lobbying contacts. Their lobbying efforts are found to consistently dwarf those of public interest groups and unions in terms of both expenditures<sup>46</sup> and overall lobbying contacts.<sup>47</sup> Among corporations, firms with higher “litigation risk,” government regulation and oversight<sup>48</sup> as well as those with poor environmental performance<sup>49</sup> are found to be more likely to lobby. The bulk of corporate lobbying is also found to be carried out by large firms and in industries with high levels of corporate concentration.<sup>50</sup> Authors have suggested various reasons for this: large firms have the capital and resources to do so, they may have greater access to politicians to influence policy, or they have the political power to influence outcomes.<sup>51</sup> Large monopolistic corporations may also believe they will be major benefactors of lobbying rather than having lobbying gains spread across a multitude of firms in a highly competitive industry (i.e., the free rider problem).<sup>52</sup>

36 This describes broad strategic attempts to shape and influence the regulatory environment and policy planning process. As Drutman (2015) notes, the strategy of the lobbyist shifts according to the perception of the policy maker’s alignment on policy issues and in terms of broad ideological orientation. The policy maker of course also takes into account the strategy of the lobbyists.

37 Drutman, *The Business of America Is Lobbying*.

38 Richter, Samphantharak, and Timmons, “Lobbying and Taxes.”

39 Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation.”

40 Delmas, Jinghui Lim, and Nairn-Birch, “Corporate Environmental Performance and Lobbying.”

41 Blau, Brough, and Thomas, “Corporate Lobbying, Political Connections, and the Bailout of Banks”; Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, “Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts.”

42 Goldman, Rocholl, and So, “Politically Connected Boards of Directors and The Allocation of Procurement Contracts.”

43 Chen, Parsley, and Yang, “Corporate Lobbying and Firm Performance.”

44 Baron, *Business and Its Environment*; de Figueiredo and Richter, “Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying.”

45 Brulle, “The Climate Lobby”; Delmas, Jinghui Lim, and Nairn-Birch, “Corporate Environmental Performance and Lobbying.”

46 Brulle, “The Climate Lobby”; de Figueiredo and Richter, “Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying.”

47 de Figueiredo and Richter, “Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying”; Graham, “State-Capital Nexus and the Making of BC Shale and Liquefied Natural Gas.”

48 Hill et al., “Determinants and Effects of Corporate Lobbying.”

49 Cho, Patten, and Roberts, “Corporate Political Strategy.”

50 Chen, Parsley, and Yang, “Corporate Lobbying and Firm Performance.”

51 de Figueiredo and Richter, “Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying.”

52 Hill et al., “Determinants and Effects of Corporate Lobbying.”



Supporting Drutman's view of relationship building and maintenance as a key component of the lobbying process, Vidal et al<sup>53</sup> find that firms pay far more for "consultant" lobbying services of those with clear connections to politicians and that lobbyists who were previously employed as high ranking government officials are the highest earning lobbyists. There is also consensus in the literature that high ranking legislators are the most likely to be targeted for lobbying and that both "allied" and "marginal" ("fence sitting") legislators are the subjects of lobbying, while those perceived as staunch enemies are typically not.<sup>54</sup>

Not surprisingly, empirical studies show that lobbying increases when salient policy issues arise or when there are big stakes for organized interests.<sup>55</sup> Considering the timing and intensity of lobbying in reference to the policy planning process, Sutton<sup>56</sup> surmises that lobbyists will seek to influence policy makers at the earliest stages, in the initial drafting or, if possible, in the pre-drafting of legislation. In this view, influencing a decision maker while their views on an issue area are "crystalizing" is considered more effective than lobbying in later drafting stages. However, based on an analysis of empirical data along with self-reporting by lobbyists, Georgiou<sup>57</sup> finds that companies lobby more or less evenly across the stages of the policy drafting process and consider "belated" lobbying (lobbying at later stages following public exposure and in final drafting stages) to be equally or more effective.

To further understand when salient policy issues arise, de Figueiredo<sup>58</sup> develops the notion of "policy windows," which are periods when there exists a favourable and open climate for changes to legislation.<sup>59</sup> Policy windows, he suggests, arise through the agency of legislators and the "offensive activity" of interest groups. Legislators will pursue issues and policies that are perceived to enhance their re-electability while organized interests may support legislators in these pursuits, creating and disseminating information to create a climate for the further opening of the window. In addition to these "endogenous" windows, policy windows also arise through "exogenous" or environmental "events" (a major environmental spill or a drop in the price of oil), which create opportunities for lobbyists.

Comprehensive research into lobbying by the fossil fuel sector at the federal level in Canada has been carried out by Cayley-Daoust and Girard in their *Big Oil's Oily Grasp*.<sup>60</sup> This impressive report examines the industry's lobbying from 2008 to 2012. It finds a steady increase in rates of lobbying by the fossil fuel industry over that period and an especially sharp rise in 2010 and 2011.<sup>61</sup> As the authors suggest, the start of this decade marked an important turning point in public debate over energy development, Indigenous sovereignty and climate change. In 2010, for example, coastal First Nations declared a ban on supertankers in waters off BC's northern coast and that year Enbridge applied to build the Northern Gateway pipeline from the Alberta tar sands to the BC coast while the NEB approved TransCanada's application for Keystone XL.

During a "policy window," legislators will pursue issues and policies that are perceived to enhance their reelectability while organized interests may support legislators in these pursuits, creating and disseminating information to create a climate for the further opening of the window.

53 Blanes i Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen, "Revolving Door Lobbyists."

54 de Figueiredo and Richter, "Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying."

55 de Figueiredo and Richter.

56 Sutton, "Lobbying of Accounting Standard-Setting Bodies in the U.K. and the U.S.A."

57 Georgiou, "Corporate Lobbying on Accounting Standards."

58 de Figueiredo, "The Timing, Intensity, and Composition of Interest Group Lobbying."

59 de Figueiredo finds that large corporations have less variance in lobbying compared to other groups. That is, businesses maintain a more steady and continued presence in legislatures, while NGOs and other types of groups are more likely to expand and contract their lobbying as resources permit and as pertinent issues and opportunities rise and decline.

60 Cayley-Daoust and Girard, "Big Oil's Oily Grasp: The Making of Canada as a Petro-State and How Oil Money Is Corrupting Canadian Politics."

61 They find that the six most active lobbyists (the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, TransCanada, Imperial Oil, the Canadian Energy Pipeline Association, Enbridge and Suncor) together more than doubled their communications with government officials between these two years.

Our research takes off from where Cayley-Daoust and Girard's ends. We track lobbying events from January 2011 to January 2018, but we also map those events as a field or network, linking the carbon extractive sector to federal institutions. We begin by providing an overview of the seven-year period, including a comparative analysis of the Harper and Trudeau years with a consideration of how overall lobbying patterns and strategies have evolved with the change in political administrations. The data are analysed across three main domains: 1) The *contacts* by fossil fuel corporations or industry associations; 2) the *designated public office holders* (DPOHs) being lobbied and their position in the state; and 3) the *governmental institutions* being lobbied. Having identified the industry organizations, state personnel and institutional targets that comprise the field of lobbying at the federal level, we then present a network analysis that integrates these three domains. Finally, drawing from the literature reviewed above and reviewing the recorded information concerning the subjects of lobbying meetings, we delineate several "lobbying windows"—time periods of intensive lobbying in the lead-up to significant government decisions such as the approval of major pipelines or the enactment of climate policy frameworks. By examining these "lobbying windows" we work to tie lobbying efforts more directly to the formation of policy.

# Sample and data

UNDER THE CURRENT FEDERAL LOBBYING ACT, which was brought into force in 2008, companies and organizations are required to register with the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada (the Office) if they engage in any of a wide range of lobbying activity, including both written and oral communication. Companies and organizations employ either “in-house lobbyists” (a lobbyist directly employed by the firm seeking to influence government) or “consultant lobbyists” (lobbyists employed by a third-party agency or firm, hired by the company or organization to lobby on its behalf) or both. The majority of lobbying by the fossil fuel sector is carried out by in-house lobbyists who must register with the Office if lobbying represents at least 20 per cent of their duties. Lobbyists (both in-house and consultant) must submit monthly filings that report the types of communication they engaged in, the subjects discussed and officials or “designated public office holders” (DPOHs) being lobbied, including their ministries and position in the state.<sup>62</sup>

Despite recent reforms and improvements, various deficiencies in the Lobbying Act impede true transparency and limit our analysis. One important limitation is the lack of detailed information on the subjects discussed during lobbying events. While the “subject matter details” are recorded, the self-reported nature of the Act means that lobbyists often provide only thin descriptions of the topics discussed. Furthermore, subject matter details are not traceable to individual meetings/communications but are rather accompanied by a “posted date” that is within one month of when a lobbying event took place. This reporting scheme makes it difficult to determine the precise nature of a lobbying event or meeting, limiting our ability to pin down the timing of lobbying in relation to “policy windows.”

In addition to lack of detailed information surrounding subject matter, the Act does not require that the names of in-house lobbyists who participated in a communication with a designated public office holder be disclosed. Instead, it is the name of the most senior paid officer who is

The majority of lobbying by the fossil fuel sector is carried out by in-house lobbyists who must register with the Office if lobbying represents at least 20 per cent of their duties.

62 Only “oral and arranged communication with a designated public office holder” (DPOH) must be reported. This includes arranged phone calls and meetings, but not impromptu (unscheduled) phone calls or meetings. Our methodology also does not include other forms of lobbying or consultation, such as industry-sponsored awards dinners, conferences and symposiums, to which government officials and politicians may be invited as speakers. DPOHs include: Ministers of the Crown or Ministers of State and any person employed in their offices; public office holders who occupy senior executive positions, whether by the title of deputy minister, chief executive officer or by some other title, or associate deputy ministers, assistant deputy ministers, or occupy a position of comparable rank. Amendment to the Designated Public Office Holder Regulations on September 20, 2010 extended the definition the DPOHs to include all Members of Parliament and all Senators, as well as any staff working in the offices of the Leaders of the Opposition in the House of Commons and the Senate.

A limitation of the Lobbying Act is that government officials are not required to keep formal records of their contacts with lobbyists.

responsible for filing a return for a corporation or organization (the registrant) that is recorded whether that person participated in a meeting/communication or not. As a result, it is not possible to determine which lobbyist(s) were involved in each meeting or whether the registrant (the senior officer, typically a chief executive) was present. This limits our ability to track lobbyists and their relationships with DPOHs.

A further limitation of the Act is that government officials are not required to keep formal records of their contacts with lobbyists. The DPOHs must only confirm the content of lobbying as reported by the lobbyist. Lobbying expenditures are also not available through the federal registry.<sup>63</sup>

A final conspicuous drawback is the data's heterogeneity and, to some extent, its poor organization. Problems such as misspelling of public office holder names, reversed first and last names, disjunction of names and position titles or even fake names are not uncommon and therefore significant verification and editing of the data was required.

To track lobbying by the fossil fuel sector, we began with 260 organizations: the 239 fossil fuel companies based in Canada with 2014 assets of at least \$50 million and 21 carbon-sector industry associations. Of these, 32 companies and 14 industry associations were found in the lobbyist registry. The data cover a seven-year period from January 4, 2011 to January 30, 2018. To enable a comparative analysis across the Harper and Trudeau administrations, the data are divided into two parts, corresponding to the two administrations with the Trudeau government taking office on November 4, 2015.

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63 Cayley-Daoust and Girard, "Big Oil's Oily Grasp: The Making of Canada as a Petro-State and How Oil Money Is Corrupting Canadian Politics."

# Top fossil fuel corporations and industry associations

CONSIDERING THE FOSSIL FUEL INDUSTRY IN CANADA AS A WHOLE, we find 11,452 lobbying contacts with government officials over the seven-year period.<sup>64</sup> This amounts to just over six contacts per working day. However, as seen in Table 1, lobbying is highly concentrated among large fossil fuel firms and major industry associations. The top 20 organizations depicted in Table 1 account for 88 per cent of the total; the remaining lobbying contacts are spread among 26 less active organizations. The leading lobbyists over the period of the study—the Mining Association of Canada (MAC) and the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP)—contributed 1,596 and 1,268 contacts respectively, accounting for a quarter of the total.

In examining the entire seven-year period, we find some minor shifts in overall lobbying patterns (visualized in Figure 1),<sup>65</sup> but the main lobbyists for the most part appear at the top of the listing throughout. Certain organizations' lobbying efforts ebbed and flowed; CAPP, for example, was

Lobbying is highly concentrated among large fossil fuel firms and major industry associations.

<sup>64</sup> The figures shown in this table and totals discussed throughout the paper refer to total lobbying contacts with DPOHs, rather than individual lobbying “events.” Therefore, if two DPOHs are involved in a meeting with a lobbyist this counts as two contacts. This is a more accurate and fulsome measure than number of lobbying events, as it provides an assessment of the number of government officials who are in contact with lobbyists. Just over 60 per cent of lobbying events involved only one DPOH.

<sup>65</sup> We have grouped the data to correspond with the key political transition from the Harper years to the Trudeau years. Thus, 2014–2015 refers to the last Harper year, from November 4, 2014 to November 3, 2015, when the Trudeau government was established; 2015–16 refers to the first Trudeau year, from November 4, 2015 to November 3, 2016. The first and last columns of this bar chart refer to partial years: in the first case, from the start of 2011 to November 3, 2011, in the second, from November 4, 2017 through January 2018, which was the terminus for available information at the time of data collection.

**Table 1: Lobbying contacts of the fossil fuel corporations and industry associations (January 4, 2011 to January 30, 2018)**

Organization	2011	2011-12	2012-13	2013-14	2014-15	% (H)	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	% (T)	Sum
Mining Association of Canada	65	223	187	233	165	11.40%	249	396	78	19.07%	1,596
Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers	158	335	256	183	77	13.17%	94	132	33	6.83%	1,268
Suncor Energy	50	92	126	137	102	6.62%	179	168	27	9.87%	881
TransCanada Corporation	127	77	126	138	109	7.53%	111	50	13	4.59%	751
Canadian Gas Association	88	158	82	94	49	6.15%	100	65	5	4.48%	641
Enbridge Inc.	44	92	131	81	51	5.21%	108	42	9	4.19%	558
Canadian Energy Pipeline Association	68	107	44	47	44	4.05%	95	69	4	4.43%	478
Teck Resources Ltd.	58	79	72	55	42	3.99%	95	59	6	4.22%	466
Kinder Morgan Canada Ltd.	20	45	127	101	12	3.98%	52	36	3	2.40%	396
Encana Corporation	115	55	45	26	23	3.45%	21	104	5	3.43%	394
Imperial Oil	54	53	30	49	52	3.11%	72	60	15	3.88%	385
Petroleum Services Association of Canada	6	29	82	58	26	2.62%	91	25	42	4.17%	359
Westcoast Energy Inc.	38	115	66	73	36	4.28%	17	8	0	0.66%	353
Shell Canada Ltd.	36	22	45	46	46	2.55%	108	33	9	3.96%	345
Canadian Fuels Association	51	67	50	45	29	3.16%	66	33	2	2.66%	343
Cenovus Energy	22	73	72	33	19	2.86%	48	11	14	1.93%	292
Chevron Canada	18	39	45	33	10	1.89%	20	15	9	1.16%	189
ATCO Group	19	30	7	31	13	1.31%	35	41	6	2.16%	182
TransAlta Corporation	10	65	14	0	0	1.16%	49	25	5	2.08%	168
Emera Inc.	41	22	14	1	0	1.02%	34	27	2	1.66%	141
Sherritt International	7	33	12	14	38	1.36%	22	0	0	0.58%	126
Talisman Energy Inc.	2	22	17	18	12	0.93%	32	19	4	1.45%	126
Canadian Natural Resources Ltd.	3	35	23	0	2	0.82%	17	28	16	1.61%	124
Husky Energy Inc.	6	21	23	13	1	0.84%	29	31	0	1.58%	124
Nexen Inc.	4	34	23	16	2	1.03%	10	26	8	1.16%	123
Exxon Canada	3	6	37	10	0	0.73%	20	35	6	1.61%	117
Syncrude Canada Ltd.	0	0	0	36	51	1.14%	6	0	0	0.16%	93
Other	25	43	78	72	63	3.67%	85	63	4	4.01%	433
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,138</b>	<b>1,972</b>	<b>1,834</b>	<b>1,643</b>	<b>1,074</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>1,865</b>	<b>1,601</b>	<b>325</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>11,452</b>

Note: Percentage figures in the table are rounded to the second decimal place.

Figure 1: Top fossil fuel lobbying organizations





Figure 2: Federal fossil fuel lobbying, 2011 to 2018



the leading lobbyist for almost three consecutive years from January 4, 2011 to November 3, 2013. In the final year of the Harper government and under Trudeau’s leadership it continued to play a central but less dominant role, while the Mining Association of Canada emerged at the leading lobbyist.

We also found a significant decline in lobbying in advance of the 2015 election (Figure 2). The finding may indicate a short-term and pragmatic lobbying strategy: in an election that was predicted to result in a change of government, lobbying contracted as firms saw less value in lobbying officials who might not remain within the state following the election. This decline, however, paralleled an augmented targeting of non-partisan senior bureaucrats (and mid-level staff), which will be explored in greater detail in the following section. Despite these shifts (and bearing in mind that the first and last columns refer to partial years—see footnote 65), we find a remarkable level of consistency in the fossil fuel lobby. Just a handful of corporations that control much of this economic sector, and key industry associations that represent them, accounted for the vast majority of lobbying each year and maintained a consistent and steady presence in the halls of government.

## Industry associations and sectoral comparisons

A handful of corporations that control much of this economic sector, and key industry associations that represent them, accounted for the vast majority of lobbying each year and maintained a consistent and steady presence in the halls of government.

Central to the network of lobbyists are fossil fuel industry associations. Along with efforts to influence public opinion (through media relations, advertising and other public relations efforts),<sup>66</sup> industry associations play a critical role in political policy and agenda setting.<sup>67</sup> They provide space for different interests within the broad carbon-capital sector to define issues of common importance and to organize strategies for advancing sectoral interests. They are able to mediate potential conflicts among fossil fuel firms, allowing corporations to speak with a single voice.

There is no one industry association that represents the entire carbon-capital sector although CAAP (whose remit includes natural gas) comes closest. As we saw in Table 1, CAPP is the second most prominent lobbyist in the network, recording 1,268 communications over the period of the study. CAPP has 36 registered “in-house” lobbyists, the most of any fossil fuel organization. Its extensive network of lobbyists brings considerable information and tailored knowledge to the table. Through 11 executive policy groups and with over 80 staff, CAPP has produced hundreds of publications on public and industry policy. These include in-house publications that promote the economic merits of extraction and present energy market statistics on industry trends such as the state of liquified natural gas (LNG) development in BC and oil and infrastructure supply.<sup>68</sup>

The fifth most active lobbyist in the study is the Canadian Gas Association (CGA), which registered 641 lobbying contacts. The CGA represents Canada’s natural gas distribution sector with its members comprising natural gas distribution and transmission companies, equipment manufacturers and other service providers. Describing itself as “the voice of Canada’s natural gas distribution industry,” the CGA defines issues of common importance and develops strategies for advancing the interests of natural gas producers and transporters. Like CAPP, the association also creates and circulates public policy briefs, videos and research reports that promote the natural gas sector.

66 Carroll et al., “The Corporate Elite and the Architecture of Climate Change Denial.”

67 Stritch, “Business Associations and Policy Analysis in Canada.”

68 Industry associations, such as CAPP, also have media and “public affairs” staff who handle media campaigns and manage social media platforms for “astroturf” groups. While this is tangential to government lobbying resources, it is relevant to industry associations’ ability to influence politicians’ perceptions of public support for various policy options.



The Canadian Energy Pipeline Association (CEPA) accounted for 478 lobbying contacts, making it the seventh most active lobbyist in the network. CEPA is an industry association representing 97 per cent of Canada's oil and natural gas pipeline companies. The total volume of fossil fuels moved by CEPA members is immense, amounting to 1.2 billion barrels of liquid petroleum products and 5.4 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in 2013. Its members include several of the largest pipeline companies in Canada, including Enbridge Pipelines Inc., ATCO Pipelines, TransCanada Pipelines Ltd. and the Trans Mountain Corporation.

The Mining Association of Canada, which recorded an astounding 1,596 lobbying contacts over the seven-year period, represents the mining sector in Canada, broadly conceived. Its members include non-fossil fuel metals mining and exploration corporations such as Cameco along with prominent fossil fuel firms. These include coal giant Teck and some of the largest bitumen mining corporations such as Suncor, CNRL and Syncrude as well as companies that are extensively involved in metals mining and oil and gas production, such as Sherritt International.

In comparison to other industry groups, fossil fuel industry associations are far more active lobbyists. MAC, CAPP, CGA and CEPA together recorded 3,983 lobbying contacts. This is five times that of the most-active forestry associations (Forest Products Association of Canada at 521 contacts, Coast Forest Products Association at 137, Canadian Association of Forest Owners at 27 and the Quebec Forest Industry Council at 27), more than six times that of automotive associations (Canadian Vehicle Manufacturer's Association at 262, Global Automakers of Canada at 154, the Canadian Automobile Dealers Association at 104 and Automotive Industries Association of Canada at 75). It is nearly 30 times that of the two renewable energy industry associations found in the lobbyists registry (the Canadian Wind Energy Association at 89 and the Canadian Solar Industries Association at 44).

## ENGOS and lobbying

By way of further comparison, we consider the amount of lobbying by environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOS)—the groups most likely to oppose increased fossil fuel development. Probably in part because of their significantly more modest resources, the amount of lobbying by ENGOS is much lower than that of fossil fuel corporations. A comprehensive search of the lobbyist registry revealed 16 organizations that were actively lobbying during the time period of our study and which together contributed 2,399 lobbying contacts, or one fifth of that of the fossil fuel sector. The Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society at 628 lobbying contacts was the most active, followed by Environmental Defence Canada (234), the Pembina Institute (227), Nature Canada (218), Ducks Unlimited Canada (215) and the David Suzuki Foundation (205).<sup>69</sup> There were 1,274 contacts under the Harper administration and 1,125 under Trudeau.

Probably in part because of their significantly more modest resources, the amount of lobbying by ENGOS is much lower (about one fifth) than that of fossil fuel corporations.

69 Further ENGOS include: World Wildlife Fund Canada (186), Ecojustice Canada (147), West Coast Environmental Law Association (147), Climate Action Network Canada (49), Canadian Wildlife Federation (48), Greenpeace Canada (36), Tides Canada (27), Nature Conservancy of Canada (17), Wildlife Habitat Canada (11) and Natural Resources Defense Council (4).

# Officials being lobbied and their positions in the state

Across the seven-year period, senior public servants (government staffers who are one level below the top bureaucrats such as assistant deputy ministers, executive directors and chiefs of staff) were the most lobbied group.

THE SECOND MAJOR DOMAIN WE EXAMINE comprises designated public office holders (DPOHs) lobbied by the fossil fuel sector and their positions in the state. We coded all the DPOH positions into six hierarchical and functional categories: Privy Council, parliamentarian, top bureaucrat, senior public servant, mid-level staff and junior staff.<sup>70</sup> As seen in Table 2, across the seven-year period, senior public servants (government staffers who are one level below the top bureaucrats such as assistant deputy ministers, executive directors and chiefs of staff) were the most lobbied group. The mid-level staff group (which encompasses advisors, policy managers and directors), was the next most targeted, followed by parliamentarians (members of Parliament and senators).

While these three categories accounted for the majority of lobbying, we observe a shift in their relative prominence when comparing the Harper and Trudeau administrations. In the Harper years covered in the study, parliamentarian was the most lobbied category, accounting for 1,972 contacts or 25 per cent of lobbying. In the final year of the Harper era, this group was targeted at a lower level (accounting for 20 per cent of contacts), which is consistent with a strategic lobbying approach taken toward an outgoing administration. However, this group remained less prominent within the Trudeau administration, moving to third position at 595 contacts or 15 per cent of lobbying, whereas senior public servants accounted for 30 per cent of lobbying contacts and mid-level staff 28 per cent.

<sup>70</sup> The Privy Council category contains specific government positions of the prime minister, governor general, house leader, minister, and parliamentary secretary. The Parliamentarian category refers to members of Parliament and senators (a small number of provincial politicians are also lumped into this bracket). Top bureaucrats consist of the deputy minister, associate deputy minister, ambassador, diplomat, parliamentary budget officer, and various chief executive titles such as the governor of the Bank of Canada. Senior public servants are the government staffers one level below the top bureaucrats: the (associate) assistant deputy minister, judge, commissioner, chief of staff, superintendent, director general, executive director, and all the deputy chief executive positions such as the CFO and VP. The mid-level staff group encompasses advisor, policy advisor, manager, director, and deputy chief of staff. Lastly, junior staff contains the assistant, clerk and secretary. An additional and non-functional category is "other", which has enveloped all the non-governmental or unclassifiable positions, including military officers, scientists and veterinarians. This very heterogeneous category is not included in the analysis of DPOHs.

**Table 2: Fluctuating composition ratio of the DPOH's positions (January 4, 2011 to January 30, 2018)**

Position	2011	2011–12	2012–13	2013–14	2014–15	2015–16	2016–17	2017–18	Total
Senior public servant	25.57%	21.91%	23.12%	26.42%	29.52%	30.40%	29.54%	23.70%	3,015
Mid-level staff	17.93%	20.23%	26.23%	21.55%	23.28%	25.74%	30.11%	28.92%	2,744
Parliamentarian	24.52%	30.43%	24.59%	25.87%	20.20%	17.53%	13.12%	17.85%	2,567
Privy Council	16.26%	15.92%	12.16%	13.27%	12.66%	13.73%	12.18%	13.54%	1,571
Top bureaucrat	13.62%	7.51%	11.94%	10.23%	12.01%	9.54%	10.81%	8.62%	1,198
Junior staff	2.11%	3.80%	1.80%	2.19%	2.33%	2.79%	4.06%	7.38%	334
Other	0%	0.20%	0.16%	0.49%	0%	0.27%	0.19%	0%	23
<b>Annual total</b>	<b>1,138</b>	<b>1,972</b>	<b>1,834</b>	<b>1,643</b>	<b>1,074</b>	<b>1,865</b>	<b>1,601</b>	<b>325</b>	<b>11,452</b>

Note: Percentage figures in the table are rounded to the second decimal place.

In addition to delineating DPOH *positions*, below we examine the top *individuals* being lobbied. In Table 3, we have identified 16 DPOHs involved in more than 75 lobbying contacts with the fossil fuel organizations over the period of our study.

These top 16 individuals can be separated into three groupings. In the first group are those who have played a durable role across the two administrations; the second cluster contains DPOHs whose centrality to the network withered shortly before or after the 2015 election; the third and final category gathers DPOHs that emerged as key lobbying targets more recently and especially under the Trudeau administration.

Mike Beale, Jay Khosla, Marian Campbell-Jarvis, Michael Keenan and Stephen Lucas are the best exemplars of the first category. As shown in Table 3, the most lobbied DPOH is Mike Beale, a long-time associate assistant deputy minister and later assistant deputy minister of Environment Canada (later renamed as Environment and Climate Change Canada). The second most contacted person is Jay Khosla, who has been assistant deputy minister of Natural Resources Canada since July 2013. Assistant deputy ministers at the federal level are conventionally the heads of a specific branch of a federal institution. For example, Mike Beale oversaw the environmental stewardship branch of Environment Canada, and Jay Khosla led the energy sector of Natural Resources Canada. Marian Campbell-Jarvis, the fifth person on the list, was appointed assistant deputy minister at the Minerals and Metals Sector of Natural Resources Canada in June 2013 after being director general at the same federal institution for more than three years.

The other two government bureaucrats who have followed a similar trajectory are deputy minister of Environment and Climate Change Canada, Stephen Lucas and deputy minister of Transport Canada Michael Keenan. Michael Keenan assumed his current post on March 14, 2016, coming from his previous position as associate deputy minister of Natural Resources Canada. Stephen Lucas took the job of deputy minister on January 23, 2017. His previous job titles included assistant deputy minister of Natural Resources Canada, deputy secretary to the cabinet and most recently senior associate deputy minister of Environment and Climate Change Canada. While his contacts with the fossil fuel organizations remained relatively constant from 2011 to 2016, the

**Table 3: Most contacted federal public office holders (January 4, 2011 to January 30, 2018)**

DPOH Name	Title	2011	2011–12	2012–13	2013–14	2014–15	2015–16	2016–17	2017–18	Total
Mike Beale	ADM	43	84	40	41	33	46	41	11	339
Jay Khosla	ADM	19	21	28	58	24	52	43	6	251
Marlo Reynolds	Chief of Staff	0	0	0	0	0	51	67	7	125
Serge Dupont	DCPC	23	23	36	33	0	5	2	0	122
M. Campbell-Jarvis	ADM	0	0	8	23	25	31	25	0	112
Joe Oliver	Minister	25	35	32	8	12	0	0	0	112
Bob Hamilton	Deputy Minister	2	6	36	23	15	19	0	0	101
Mark Corey	ADM	28	41	27	0	0	0	0	0	96
Dave Forestell	Chief of Staff	21	54	20	0	0	0	0	0	95
Greg McFarlane	Chief of Staff	0	15	52	24	3	0	0	0	94
Christopher Praught	Advisor	3	7	34	22	19	0	0	0	85
James Carr	Minister	0	0	0	0	0	42	29	13	84
Michael Keenan	Deputy Minister	5	8	21	23	5	13	7	0	82
Jason Kenney	Minister	23	22	15	14	5	2	0	0	81
Guillaume Julien	Advisor	0	0	0	0	0	11	52	17	80
Stephen Lucas	Deputy Minister	1	6	11	12	5	11	30	1	77
Other	N/A	945	1,650	1,474	1,362	928	1,582	1,305	270	9,516
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,138</b>	<b>1,138</b>	<b>1,972</b>	<b>1,834</b>	<b>1,643</b>	<b>1,074</b>	<b>1,865</b>	<b>1,601</b>	<b>325</b>	<b>11,452</b>

Note: DCPC and ADM refer to Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council and Assistant (or Associate Assistant) Deputy Minister, respectively.

figures went up swiftly in 2017 when he was promoted to the deputy minister's post. Common to these individuals who have durable and long-standing relations with the fossil fuel lobby is they are located within the non-partisan government bureaucracy with the typical position they hold being the bureaucratic chief of an energy-focused federal institution (e.g., a deputy minister) or the head of a specific branch within the institution (e.g., an assistant deputy minister).

Members of the second group, whose centrality in the fossil fuels lobby network decreased shortly preceding or following the change of administration, are Serge Dupont, Joe Oliver, Mark Corey, Bob Hamilton, Dave Forestell, Jason Kenney, Christopher Praught and Greg McFarlane. The reason for their dwindling centrality is removal from key positions at energy-focused federal institutions either through retirement, career change or electoral defeat. For example, Dupont

and Hamilton both served as deputy ministers of an energy-focused federal institution in the earlier portion of our study, but have since moved to other branches of government that are less pertinent to carbon extractive development. Joe Oliver and Jason Kenney were both Conservative MPs, with the former serving from 2011 to 2015 and the latter from 1997 to September 2016. Joe Oliver was heavily lobbied in his position as minister of natural resources from May 2011 to March 2014 (and somewhat less so as minister of finance from March 2014 to November 2015), as was Kenney, who has long played a central role within the Conservative Party and served as minister of citizenship, immigration and multiculturalism from 2008 to 2013 before being named minister of employment and social development in July 2013. Kenney's lobbying contacts dwindled following the Conservative defeat in 2015 and before he resigned his seat in Parliament in 2016. In October 2017, he was elected leader of Alberta's Conservative Party.

The final group consists of DPOHs who have more recently emerged as central targets of the fossil fuel lobby. This category includes Marlo Reynolds, Guillaume Julien, James Carr and Marian Campbell-Jarvis. Carr is an example of a recently elected MP and minister in a key state institution who has subsequently been heavily lobbied by the fossil fuel sector. Carr was elected in the 2015 federal election representing Winnipeg South Centre and was named minister of natural resources on November 4, 2015, a title he held until July 18, 2018. Between November 4, 2015 and January 30, 2018, he was lobbied 84 times by fossil fuel groups. This was just slightly below the total number of lobbying contacts reported with Carr's predecessor, Joe Oliver, who was lobbied 100 times as minister of natural resources under the Harper government in a similar time frame from May 18, 2011 to March 18, 2014. Marlo Reynolds was executive director of the Pembina Institute from 2004 to 2010 and a senior advisor to Pembina from 2011 to 2012. He ran as a candidate in Alberta for the Liberal Party in the 2015 federal election and after his defeat was named chief of staff to Minister of Environment and Climate Change Catherine McKenna in November 2015. Guillaume Julien has been heavily lobbied since becoming a policy advisor at Natural Resources Canada in April 2016 (leaving his previous job as coordinator of communications at Glencore, a major global natural resource company).

To summarize, in contrast to relationships with elected politicians or partisan staffers, which can shift dramatically as governments change, the fossil fuel sector maintains ongoing relationships with DPOHs in the non-partisan government bureaucracy. While forming relationships with individuals is a component of the lobbying effort, DPOHs are lobbied by virtue of their role/position within key state bodies. As lobbying targets, elected politicians and politically affiliated staffers rise and fall with the fortunes of their parties. Joe Oliver and Jason Kenney are two illustrative examples of how partisans sank with their party while James Carr and Marlo Reynolds exemplified how party stalwarts can rapidly emerge as key targets.


There was also a shift after the 2015 change in government toward targeting senior public servants. Among the top 10 senior government bureaucrats who remained in their positions after the election, annual contacts with fossil fuel interest groups averaged 144.5 under the Harper administration and 228.5 under the Trudeau government.<sup>71</sup> And, as the findings in Table 2 show, 39.79 per cent of all lobbying contacts during the latter part of the Harper administration involved parliamentarians and members of the Privy Council compared to the first part of the Trudeau administration. When the government changed, it was the senior government bureaucrats who continued to be the targets of extensive lobbying—and at an increased rate. This points toward a “deep state” or “state within a state”<sup>72</sup> whereby key state institutions and actors

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71 Senior government bureaucrats here include only nonpartisan top bureaucrats (DM, ADM and president) and senior public servants (AADM and vice-president) while party-affiliated chief of staff is excluded.

72 Lofgren, *The Deep State*; Taft, *Oil's Deep State*.

Figure 3: Federal institutions lobbied



The deep state, which retains substantial autonomy from controls or regulation by elected officials, far outlasts election cycles.

become extensively integrated with private firms and interests groups that together co-produce regulation and policy and “with only limited reference to the consent of the governed as normally expressed in elections.”<sup>73</sup> In an established deep state, “leading owners and executives of major private interests” are fused together with state managers “inordinately committed to the success of those interests.”<sup>74</sup> The deep state, which retains substantial autonomy from controls or regulation by elected officials, far outlasts election cycles.

The third domain of analysis concerns the institutions of the federal government that were lobbied by the fossil fuel industry. Given its important legislative role, we divide the House of Commons into two additional specific categories: the elected politicians and the hired staffers who assist them. The former category is coded as House of Commons (P) and the latter coded as House of Commons (S).

Even after the division, the House of Commons (P) was still the most lobbied institution by the fossil fuel industry across the seven-year period of our study.

As depicted in Figure 3, we find both continuity and discontinuity concerning state institutions that were lobbied across the administrations. Under Harper, the House of Commons (P) was the most lobbied institution by the fossil fuel industry and was the primary target across each of the yearly intervals. However, consistent with the trend for elected politicians to become less targeted for lobbying under Trudeau in favour of senior public servants and the mid-level staff, the House of Commons (P) became less targeted in the first year of Trudeau’s government and was overtaken by Natural Resources Canada, which was the most targeted institution in each year under Trudeau. More industry attention was directed at Environment Canada under Trudeau, which was the second most targeted institution in 2016–17. Global Affairs Canada and to a lesser extent Science and Economic Development Canada and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency also became more prominent.

73 Garrett Quoted Taft, *Oil’s Deep State*, 118.

74 Taft, 118.

# The network overall, from Harper to Trudeau

HAVING IDENTIFIED THE INDUSTRY ORGANIZATIONS, state personnel and institutional targets that comprise the field of lobbying at the federal level, we now present a network analysis that integrates these three domains focusing on the volume of lobbying relations between fossil fuel capital organizations and state targets (both institutions and DPOHs).

A social network consists of a set of *nodes*, some of which are directly linked to others through *lines*, i.e., relations. In this case, the lines are *directed* as they always flow from lobbyist to target (notwithstanding the likelihood that some meetings were convened by DPOHs). A lobbying relation entails one or more contacts between a lobbying organization and a state body or DPOH. Examining the network of these relations gives us a picture of the structure of corporate influence vis-à-vis the various organizations that make up the federal state apparatus. Each lobbying relation consists of a series of actual contacts involving lobbyists and DPOHs. By examining the frequency of such contacts as recorded in the lobbyist registry, we can determine which lobbying relations involve high volumes of interaction. These are the *intensive relations*, forming the core of the network.

Within the timeframe of our study, the Harper government was in power for 1,764 days compared to 818 for the Trudeau government, affording 2.156 times as many daily opportunities for lobbyists to meet with state officials. The total volume of lobbying for the governments, respectively 7,661 and 3,791, roughly corresponds to this ratio, indicating that across the two administrations the overall volume of lobbying was similar.

Table 4 compares lobbying networks for the two administrations at two levels of lobbying volume. We designate high-volume lobbying in the Harper years as relations involving 30 or more contacts between a lobbyist and a state target. Pro-rated to the shorter timeframe of the Trudeau years, high-volume lobbying relations are deemed to involve 15 or more contacts. Considering first the entire network of lobbying relations, 44 industry groups (corporations and industry groups) and 51 state bodies with the former linked to the latter through 595 lobbying relations were involved in the Harper years. The entire network under Trudeau was smaller and involved fewer lobbying relations overall, which is not surprising in view of the shorter time period under observation. When we restrict the analysis to high-volume lobbying relations, the core of the network, most of the lines and many of the nodes fall away. Interestingly, however, the network of high-volume lobbying relations in the Trudeau years is slightly larger and has more industry-state relations than the Harper network.

The total volume of lobbying for the governments indicates that across the two administrations the overall volume of lobbying was similar.

**Table 4: Comparison of lobbying network for the two administrations**

	Number of lines	Number of industry organizations	Number of state bodies
Harper government: all relations	595	44	51
Harper government: high-volume relations <sup>a</sup>	58	20	12
Trudeau government: all relations	409	39	40
Trudeau government: high-volume relations <sup>b</sup>	69	25	13

Notes: a Relations involving 30 or more contacts between a lobbyist and a state target.

b Relations involving 15 or more contacts between a lobbyist and a state target.



# Concentration of lobbying follows the concentration of capital

FOR BOTH REGIMES, LOBBYING IS EXTREMELY CONCENTRATED among the major players and their intensive, high-volume lobby relations. Under Harper, the intensive lobbying relations (as defined above) account for only 9.75 per cent of all lobbying relations (59 of 595), but these relations represent 94.3 per cent of the 7,661 lobbying contacts occurring between industry and the federal state apparatus. Similarly, under Trudeau, intensive lobbying relations account for only 9.8 per cent of all lobbying relations (40 of 369), but these relations represent 95.9 per cent of the 3,791 lobbying contacts occurring between industry and the federal state apparatus. Across the two administrations, the overall pattern of lobbying is stable: among the 239 fossil fuel companies we included in our sweep of the lobbyist registry, the Pearson correlation<sup>75</sup> between frequency of contacts during the Harper years and frequency of contacts during Trudeau is 0.887.

Fossil fuel industry lobbying, like fossil capital itself, is concentrated among relatively few large corporations. For the 239 companies, the Pearson correlation between frequency of contacts and 2014 firm revenue is 0.728 for the Harper years and 0.820 for the Trudeau years. Using 2014 assets as a measure of size (which favours companies with large amounts of fixed capital), the correlations are even higher: 0.810 and 0.837 respectively. Not surprisingly, among the 239 fossil fuel firms, active lobbying at the federal level is restricted to a small fraction of companies. During the entire period, 205 companies did no lobbying, five firms lobbied only under Harper and four lobbied only under Trudeau. The close relationship between firm size and lobbying is highlighted when we isolate the 10 largest companies by 2014 revenue, which all rank among the top lobbyists. In the Harper years, 67.6 per cent of all corporate lobbying (4,191 contacts in total) involved these 10 firms; for Trudeau the figure is 71.7 per cent. The simple contrast between the top 10 revenue earners and the 229 smaller firms accounts, under Harper is 62.1 per cent of the variance in frequency of contacts and under Trudeau 66.5 per cent.

Fossil fuel industry lobbying, like fossil capital itself, is concentrated among relatively few large corporations.

<sup>75</sup> The Pearson correlation is a statistical measure of the extent to which two variables are linearly related. The Pearson correlation varies from -1 (indicating a perfect inverse relationship) to +1 (indicating a perfect direct relationship, with the values of one variable rising exactly in step with the values of the other variable).

As we have seen, lobbying activity at the federal level is concentrated among a few industry groups that tend to represent the larger concentrations of fossil capital. Six of 14 industry groups accounted for 89.5 per cent of fossil fuel industry group contacts under Harper and 92.0 per cent under Trudeau. As a group, the four most active industry associations (CAPP, MAC, CEPA and Canadian Gas Association, each representing very large corporations) account for 76.8 per cent of all lobbying by the 14 industry associations over the entire 2011–2018 period. We can also discern change over time associated with sectoral rise and decline: the Coal Association of Canada lobbied the Harper government 10 times, but did not lobby the Trudeau government. The BC LNG Association did not lobby the Harper government, but lobbied the Trudeau government seven times. We can conclude that the concentration in lobbying closely mirrors the ongoing concentration of fossil capital.

# Mapping the core network: state targets and lobbying organizations


FIGURE 4 SHOWS STATE INSTITUTIONS with 30 or more lobbying contacts with fossil fuel organizations under the Harper years. In the diagram, each node represents a specific institution with the blue circles referring to the fossil fuel organizations and the yellow squares depicting state targets. The size of the nodes indicates the (degree) centrality of the institutions and organizations within the network (the more central the organization, the larger the node). Their locations on the diagrams are also good indicators of their relative importance: the key fossil fuel organizations and state targets tend to be located in the centre of the graph. In contrast, nodes are smaller for the less important organizations and typically appear on the periphery of the graph. Line thickness is proportional to the number of lobbying contacts between carbon firms and government institutions.

In the Harper years, the main industry players focused their lobbying efforts on a dozen key state bodies. The high-volume lobby relations focused on Natural Resources Canada (NRCan), politicians associated with the House of Commons (CommonsP) and, to a lesser extent, Environment Canada (EnvirtCan), with Foreign Affairs (DFAITC), Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development (AAND) and the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) being the only other state bodies lobbied extensively by three or more fossil fuel organizations. Among the lobbyists, CAPP and the Mining Association of Canada maintained extensive high-volume lobbying networks reaching into various state bodies, particularly Natural Resources Canada, the House of Commons (P) and Environment Canada. CAPP logged 335 contacts with the House of Commons (P), 180 with Natural Resources Canada and 177 with Environment Canada. The Mining Association of Canada logged 214 contacts with Natural Resources Canada, 186 with the House of Commons (P) and 102 with Environment Canada. The TransCanada Corporation and several other firms also maintained fairly extensive lobbying networks. Three industry associations and four corporations each had high-volume relations with the same triad of core state organizations throughout the Harper years.

Figure 5 depicts the lobbying relations between these state targets and the fossil fuel organizations under Trudeau. The high-volume lobby relations under Trudeau continue to target Natural Resources Canada, House of Commons (P) and Environment Canada. If anything, the network has


In the Harper years, high-volume lobby relations focused on Natural Resources Canada, politicians associated with the House of Commons and, to a lesser extent, Environment Canada, with Foreign Affairs, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development and the Prime Minister's Office being the only other state bodies lobbied extensively by three or more fossil fuel organizations.

Figure 4: Network diagram for lobbying relations involving 30 or more contacts, Harper administration



See Appendix for full names of abbreviated organizations, DPOHs and federal institutions.

Figure 5: Network diagram for lobbying relations involving 15 or more contacts, Trudeau administration



See Appendix for full names of abbreviated organizations, DPOHs and federal institutions.

become more tightly focused around this triad, with five industry associations and six corporations logging high-volume lobby relations with all three state bodies. The Mining Association of Canada has gained prominence in the network while CAPP's volume of lobbying has declined. Among the corporations, Suncor stands out for its extensive lobbying of both Environment Canada (82 contacts) and Natural Resources Canada (69 contacts). Global Affairs (formerly Foreign Affairs) continues to be targeted by the Mining Association (which also represents metal-mining firms, some of them with extensive foreign investments) and for TransCanada, whose Keystone XL project has been strongly pitched to US state managers by both the Harper and Trudeau governments. CEPA now targets the National Energy Board (NEB), likely concerning changes (as discussed below) to the NEB and environmental review processes announced by Trudeau along with major pipeline project proposals and decisions involving firms that CEPA represents such as Northern Gateway and the Trans Mountain Pipeline Expansion.

As we can see in both sociograms, intensive lobbying is largely restricted to the major players, which have the resources for permanent campaigns, and it is aimed at a select few centres of state power. This suggests that the network core comprises a small world of intense interaction among a relative few lobbyists and the designated public office holders who are their targets.

The high-volume lobby relations under Trudeau continue to target Natural Resources Canada, the House of Commons and Environment Canada. If anything, the network has become more tightly focused around this triad.

# Small world of designated public office holders

The social circle of industry organizations lobbying Mike Beale, assistant deputy minister at Environment Canada (which is ostensibly tasked with environmental protection), speaks volumes about the fossil fuel sector's influence over environmental policy.

AS WE SAW EARLIER, LEADING DPOHS MEET EXTENSIVELY with representatives of the fossil fuel industry. In this section we map the contours of this small world, focusing on the 20 most-lobbied DPOHs of each administration. In contrast to the principal lobbyists, the registry records precisely identify which DPOHs met with lobbyists on each occasion. There is no provision for delegating such meetings to other state officials.


## Harper years

In the Harper years, the 20 DPOHs account for 1,785 of 7,661 contacts, meaning nearly a quarter of all lobbying (23.3 per cent) was targeted at this small group. Although within the registry each DPOH typically has one main state affiliation, these can be variable—either due to actual position changes or to designating the same person in different ways; hence the mapping displays multiple state affiliations for many of the DPOHs. In all, the fossil fuel sector logged 373 lobbying relations with these 20 individuals, creating a network (shown in Figure 6) of 37 industry organizations (blue squares) and 17 state bodies (yellow squares) with the 20 DPOHs (red circles) mediating between them.<sup>76</sup> The network is to some extent bifurcated between DPOHs affiliated with the Ministry of Natural Resources (predominantly the red circles at the left and bottom) and DPOHs affiliated with the Ministry of Environment, with the former attracting considerably more attention.

We can see how each DPOH funnels communications from an array of industry representatives into their respective state agency. For instance, at the bottom centre of the sociogram in Figure 6, Mike Beale, assistant deputy minister at Environment Canada (who met with 21 different industry organizations 241 times during the Harper years studied), was intensively lobbied by CAPP (76 meetings) and the Canadian Fuels Association (61 meetings). In Figure 7, the social circle of industry organizations lobbying Beale, a functionary ostensibly tasked with environmental protection, speaks volumes about the fossil fuel sector's influence over environmental policy.


<sup>76</sup> This network map (also Figure 9) summarizes, for each DPOH, the number of meetings with a given industry organization while designated as affiliated with a given state body. The thickness of lines reflects the number of meetings held; the size of the node reflects the overall centrality of a person or organization in the network.

Figure 6: The network of 20 most-lobbed DPOHs, Harper years



See Appendix for full names of abbreviated organizations, DPOHs and federal institutions.


Figure 7: Mike Beale's social circle, Harper years



See Appendix for full names of abbreviated organizations, DPOHs and federal institutions.

Beale's heavily targeted colleagues at Environment Canada recorded fewer meetings overall and show distinct patterns of contact with industry. Collen Volk logged 56 meetings in total with 11 organizations, but 26 meetings were with the Mining Association of Canada. Deputy Minister Bob Hamilton, logging 82 meetings, shows a more diffuse pattern, connecting with 24 organizations, including 17 meetings with CAPP. For much of the 2011–2015 period, Peter Kent (positioned near the top of the map in Figure 6) served as environment minister and met with 20 fossil fuel

Figure 8: Joe Oliver's social circle, Harper years



See Appendix for full names of abbreviated organizations, DPOHs and federal institutions.

In all, two politicians and four public servants affiliated with Environment Canada were extensively targeted in the Harper years.

organizations a total of 67 times, but no one organization stands out (CAPP merited 9 meetings, Suncor 7, Imperial Oil and Cenovus 6, etc.). The same pattern holds for Michelle Rempel, a Calgary-based MP who served as parliamentary secretary to the minister of environment, beginning in May 2011. This pattern suggests a division of labour among state officials as specific public servants take primary responsibility for meeting with certain lobbying organizations (as in Mike Beale's 76 meetings with CAPP), while elected politicians maintain a wider but more diffuse array of fossil fuel industry contacts. In all, two politicians and four public servants affiliated with Environment Canada were extensively targeted in the Harper years.


At Natural Resources Canada, the situation was a little different. Eleven DPOHs associated with this ministry were targeted, including 10 top public servants and Joe Oliver (positioned at the centre left of Figure 6), who served as minister of natural resources from 2011 to 2014 (and then as finance minister). Oliver, whose social circle is shown in Figure 8, was lobbied 112 times by 27 fossil fuel organizations, including TransCanada (12 meetings), Kinder Morgan (10), Encana (9) and CAPP (8), mainly during his tenure as minister of natural resources.

Among the officials at Natural Resources Canada, Marian Campbell-Jarvis was heavily lobbied by the Mining Association of Canada (48 of her 56 meetings) as was Anil Arora (40 of 67 meetings). Chris Praught's 88 meetings featured conversations with Suncor (11), CAPP and TransCanada (10 each). The other five public servants logged a total of 491 contacts, a good number of which involved CAPP (14 with Mark Corey, 11 with Serge Dupont, 13 with Michael Keenen, 21 with Jay Khosla), the Mining Association of Canada (14 with Serge Dupont, 11 with Jay Khosla), CEPA (11 with Mark Corey, 23 with Jay Khosla) and the Canadian Gas Association (21 with Jay Khosla and 13 with David McArthur who was also affiliated with the ministry of Aboriginal affairs).

A third notable category of DPOHs comprises elected politicians unaffiliated with the two ministries most targeted by the carbon-extractive sector. Here, Calgary-based Jason Kenney (positioned at the top left of Figure 6) stands out. Kenney was, like other parliamentarians, lobbied by a wide



Figure 9: The network of 20 most-lobbied DPOHs, Trudeau years



See Appendix for full names of abbreviated organizations, DPOHs and federal institutions.

array of organizations. Leon Benoit and James Rajotte were also Conservative parliamentarians extensively lobbied by the fossil fuel sector.

It is well known that in the Harper government power was particularly concentrated in the Prime Minister’s Office (positioned at the top right in Figure 6). There, Greg McFarlane, a senior policy advisor, was lobbied by 22 organizations with MAC logging 16 meetings, CAPP logging 15 and TransCanada logging 11. McFarlane was joined as a PMO official by Dave Forestell (also affiliated with Natural Resources Canada) who was lobbied by 21 fossil fuel organizations during the Harper years. In that period, as also evidenced in our other views of the network in the Harper years, Natural Resources Canada clearly attracted more industry attention than Environment Canada. Eleven DPOHs affiliated with Natural Resources were heavily lobbied compared to six DPOHs affiliated with Environment Canada, perhaps reflecting the relative power capacities of these two ministries within the Harper administration.


## Trudeau years

In the first part of Trudeau’s mandate (to early 2018), the top 20 DPOHs accounted for 1,226 of 3,791 meetings—nearly a third—indicating that lobbying had become somewhat more concentrated among the top DPOHs. Also in contrast to the Harper administration, each of the 20 most-lobbied DPOHs tended to be affiliated to just one state body. Lobbying relations between corporations and these officials total 345 and include 33 industry organizations, but only nine state bodies. The lobbying network became more focused on fewer state agencies, with Natural Resources Canada and Environment Canada holding pride of place.

Indeed, as we see in Figure 9, under Trudeau the network has become more bifurcated between Natural Resources Canada and Environment Canada, particularly as we note that the Canadian

During the Trudeau years, the lobbying network became more focused on fewer state agencies, with Natural Resources Canada and Environment Canada holding pride of place.

Figure 10: Lobbying relations targeting Jim Carr or Catherine McKenna, Trudeau years



See Appendix for full names of abbreviated organizations, DPOHs and federal institutions.


Imperial Oil, Cenovus, Encana and Teck are also heavily engaged in lobbying the key DPOHs associated with Environment Canada and Natural Resources Canada.

Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA, positioned at the top right) reports to the federal minister of the environment and climate change, and can be considered a branch of that ministry. Ten of the leading DPOHs are affiliated with Natural Resources Canada, seven are affiliated with Environment Canada, two are affiliated with CEAA and one is affiliated with the ministry of finance. Senior public servants are heavily targeted, with Mike Beale continuing to attract many lobbyists at Environment Canada along with ministers McKenna and Carr (as well as Kim Rudd, parliamentary secretary to Carr and Jonathan Wilkinson, parliamentary secretary to McKenna).

Among the industry organizations, MAC and CAPP stand out along with CEPA, the Canadian Fuels Association and the Canadian Gas Association. The Mining Association of Canada is especially central, showing lobbying relations with 19 DPOHs, 16 of whom were solicited at least five times. CAPP lobbied 18 of the 20 top DPOHs, although only six of these relations involved five or more meetings (and all of these relatively intense relations were with public servants). Among the corporations, TransCanada's heavy targeting of DPOHs under Harper has fallen away, but Suncor has stepped up its lobbying, contacting 19 of 20 top DPOHs in the Trudeau government's early years, 10 of them on at least five occasions. Imperial Oil, Cenovus, Encana and Teck are also heavily engaged in lobbying the key DPOHs associated with Environment Canada and Natural Resources Canada. Some public servant DPOHs carry over from one administration to the next, along with their lobbying contacts in industry. For instance, Marian Campbell-Jarvis at Natural Resources Canada continues to meet regularly with MAC (logging 23 meetings) as does Mike Beale at Environment Canada (logging 18).

Mapping the lobbying relations that converge upon the two ministers, Carr and McKenna (Figure 10), we find that Carr was lobbied by 25 industry organizations and McKenna by 21. All but one of the industry organizations lobbying McKenna also lobbied Carr and the tendency was for Carr

Figure 11: The network of most-lobbied DPOHs, relations involving five or more meetings, Trudeau years



See Appendix for full names of abbreviated organizations, DPOHs and federal institutions.

(whose tenure as minister of natural resources ended with a cabinet shuffle in July 2018) to meet more frequently with industry representatives.<sup>77</sup>

Noting that 131 of the lines in Figure 9 depict lobbying relations in which only one meeting occurred between the parties, in Figure 11 we show only the 93 relations during the Trudeau years that involved five or more meetings between lobbyists and the DPOHs. Node size is proportionate to centrality in this reduced network, which contains 19 of the 20 DPOHs, six state bodies with which they are affiliated and 16 industry organizations. The two target ministries form opposite poles, with the Mining Association of Canada, Suncor and Shell Canada occupying particularly central locations, heavily lobbying both ministries. Most of the industry organizations were engaged in intensive lobbying with DPOHs in both ministries. Big carbon appears to have taken to Justin Trudeau’s 2015 election pledge that “We can create clean jobs, grow our economy, and protect our environment by working together.”<sup>78</sup>

In both governments we find at the network’s core a small world of leading industry organizations and DPOHs associated with state agencies key to fossil fuel industry interests who are in regular contact with each other.

In both governments we find at the network’s core a small world of leading industry organizations and DPOHs associated with state agencies key to fossil fuel industry interests who are in regular contact with each other.

77 Two noteworthy exceptions: Teck Resources, which has branded itself as a green extractivist despite major recent investments in bitumen mining, met with Carr twice, but with McKenna five times; Suncor Energy met with Carr seven times and with McKenna 11 times. Suncor is also an advocate of green capitalism. Its current greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions goal is to “harness technology and innovation to reduce our emission intensity by 30% by 2030” (<https://www.suncor.com/sustainability/ghg-goal>, accessed August 11, 2019). As is widely known by environmentalists, modestly reducing emission intensity while ramping up carbon extraction — Suncor’s actual business strategy — produces increased carbon emissions.

78 “Real change: A new plan for Canada’s environment and economy,” Liberal Party of Canada website, <https://www.liberal.ca/realchange/real-change-a-new-plan-for-canadas-environment-and-economy/>, accessed 16 January 2019.

# Lobbying windows and subject matter details

The highest recorded amount of industry lobbying was November 4, 2011 to November 3, 2012. This corresponds closely to sweeping amendments made to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act.

SO FAR, WE HAVE PROVIDED AN ARCHITECTURAL OVERVIEW OF LOBBYING at the federal level. In this section, we hone in on specific “lobbying windows,” by considering the timing and intensity of lobbying in reference to important policy frameworks and periods where there are large stakes for key industry players (such as decisions surrounding pipeline proposals). This allows us to tie lobbying efforts more closely to the formation of policy.

## Environmental assessments

Earlier in this report we noted that our first full year interval from November 4, 2011 to November 3, 2012 was the highest recorded year of lobbying from the sector. It was also the year with the highest recorded amount of lobbying by prominent industry associations including CAPP, the Canadian Gas Association and the Canadian Energy Pipeline Association. The time period corresponds closely to sweeping amendments made in 2012 to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA-2012). According to government information, a parliamentary review of the Act began on October 18, 2011.<sup>79</sup> The CEAA-2012 was introduced in the House of Commons as part of an omnibus bill on April 26, 2012. In contrast to the open deliberations leading to the original Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (1999), CEAA-2012 was preceded by no official preliminary proposals and no public consultations.<sup>80</sup> The changes were pushed quickly through the legislative process by a determined majority government (Ibid) while government advocates of the new laws, such as then-natural resources minister Joe Oliver (who was heavily lobbied during this period), characterized the amendments as streamlining a “cumbersome” review process and ensuring more timely assessments of significant projects.<sup>81</sup> The Act came into force on July 6, 2012.

As discussed above, on January 26, 2012, the Canadian Energy Pipeline Association lobbied high ranking officials at the ministry of environment concerning pending amendments to the Canadian

79 “Peter Kent pipelines meeting,” uploaded by Mike de Souza, Scribd, page 5: <https://www.scribd.com/document/107088634/Peter-Kent-pipelines-meeting>.

80 Gibson, “In Full Retreat.”

81 Davidson, Andrew. “Ottawa to Slash Environment Review Role,” *CBC News*, April 17, 2012. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/ottawa-to-slash-environment-review-role-1.1158340>.

Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA-2012). An internal briefing note prepared for then-environment minister Peter Kent (released through access to information legislation) recommended that Kent and his colleagues ensure the industry association that oil, gas and pipeline companies (and specific pipelines linking Alberta's tar sands industry to the British Columbia coast such as Enbridge's Northern Gateway) would be "top-of-mind" in the changes to the laws.<sup>82</sup> A week later, on February 2, 2012, tar sands producer Canadian Natural Resources lobbied Kent's parliamentary secretary Michelle Rempel. Briefing notes for the meeting, also obtained by Postmedia, suggested that Rempel recognize that the legislation was "very controversial" and to ask industry, before even tabling the plan in Parliament, to help promote it to the public.<sup>83</sup> On the other hand, briefing notes prepared for Kent for a government summit with First Nations groups in January 2012 suggested giving representatives from the Assembly of First Nations a vague message regarding pending reforms, including that any news they were hearing about the changes was "speculative."<sup>84</sup>

At our level of analysis (and given the limitations of the registry data noted above), it is not possible to determine the specific nature and detailed content of meetings between fossil fuel firms and public officials. However, in addition to the high number of lobbying contacts by industry over this period, an analysis of subject matters, as reported by industry, is revealing.<sup>85</sup> From October 2011, when the review process began, to July 2012 when legislation was passed, the CEAA-2012 was listed as the subject of lobbying meetings 122 times (42 of these took place between October 2011 and January 2012). The omnibus bill, Bill C-38, was explicitly listed as the subject seven times. Other acts and laws that were reformed under CEAA-2012 were also listed as subjects of meetings. Amendments to or potential streamlining of the Fisheries Act were listed 85 times, the Species at Risk Act 93 times, the Migratory Birds Convention Act 26 times and the National Energy Board Act 19 times.

As for the Trudeau regime, the major lobbying window to date opened as the government began to implement its 2015 campaign promise to "modernize" the NEB and the environmental regulatory process. According to subject matter details reviewable via the federal lobbyist registry, already in January 2016, the Canadian Energy Pipeline Association was lobbying on a pending "Review of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act — as it relates to energy pipelines projects." The Act was subsequently the subject of lobbying 307 times between January 2016 and the end of our study (January 2018). The subject was listed 152 times between January 2016 and January 2017 and 155 times from February 2017 to January 2018. The Fisheries Act was listed as the subject matter 174 times, the Species at Risk Act 228 times, the Migratory Birds Convention Act 110 times, the National Energy Board Act 32 times and National Energy Board review and or modernization 57 times.

The review of the Act and other laws also help explain MAC's increased lobbying activity under Trudeau, especially beginning in 2016. Immediately following the announcement of a federal

During the Trudeau regime, the major lobbying window to date opened as the government began to implement its 2015 campaign promise to "modernize" the NEB and the environmental regulatory process.

82 Mike de Souza, "Pipeline development was 'top of mind' in Stephen Harper's budget bill, say 'secret' records," Canada.com, September 28, 2012, <https://o.canada.com/uncategorized/pipeline-development-was-top-of-mind-in-budget-bill-says-secret-records>.

83 Mike De Souza, "Bureaucrats told Stephen Harper's government environmental reforms would be 'very controversial,' records reveal," Canada.com, January 29, 2013, <https://o.canada.com/news/national/bureaucrats-told-stephen-harpers-government-environmental-reforms-would-be-very-controversial-records-reveal>.

84 Mike De Souza, "Federal government sent mixed messages to industry, First Nations about environmental reforms," Canada.com, February 24, 2013, <https://o.canada.com/news/national/stephen-harpers-government-sent-mixed-messages-to-industry-first-nations-about-environmental-reforms>.

85 While it is not possible to tie subject matter details to individual meetings, the intended outcomes of meeting are accompanied by a "posted date," which is within a month of when a lobbying communication took place.

review of Canada's environmental laws on June 20, the association announced that it "plans to be a full, active participant in the federal government's review of environmental and regulatory processes."<sup>86</sup> It argued that in contrast to other sectors, the legislative reforms of 2012 did not result in diminished federal oversight of mining projects and that it was vital to combat any perception indicating otherwise and which could result in tighter regulations. Later announcements in response to draft legislation asserted that pending changes "could adversely impact the industry's competitiveness and growth prospects" and that it is critical for the government to work with MAC to ensure an "effective and efficient project review process."<sup>87</sup>

In January 2016, the government announced an interim review process that included additional steps for oil and gas pipeline projects currently undergoing regulatory review. In June 2016, it announced a sweeping review of Canada's environmental laws as part of a plan to revise and overhaul laws that were introduced under CEAA-2012.<sup>88</sup> It subsequently appointed an expert panel to examine the issue and then on June 29, 2017 published a discussion paper.<sup>89</sup> In February 2018, the government introduced Bill C-69 to the House of Commons where it passed. In June 2018, the Senate began an official review of the bill.

On June 6, 2019, the Canadian Senate approved more than 180 amendments to Bill C-69—amendments that closely mirror requests from the oil and gas industry, which had expressed widespread opposition to the original bill.

The government's original Bill C-69 was intended to replace the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency with the Impact Assessment Agency of Canada. The bill also mandated changes to the Navigable Waters Act and replaced the National Energy Board with the Canadian Energy Regulator. Environmental lawyers pointed to some modest improvements to environmental assessment legislation introduced by Bill C-69. The bill, via the Impact Assessment Act, promised more robust assessments of the environmental impacts of major resource projects, including consideration of climactic impacts. It also introduced a more comprehensive examination of social, economic and health impacts, including effects on Indigenous rights and culture, to be considered early in the planning process.<sup>90</sup> As Gibson<sup>91</sup> reports, Bill C-69 would also improve government accountability for final decisions as the new legislation would compel cabinet to provide reasons for its decisions and justify them. On the other hand, environmental groups and lawyers say the government's original Bill C-69 did not go far enough to reverse the Harper government's deregulation or to address climate change effects of extractive industries.<sup>92</sup> It also provided few concrete measures for making assessments less susceptible to corporate pressure, a key feature of any attempt to make environmental assessments credible.<sup>93</sup>

Bill C-69 was passed in the House of Commons in February 2018 after the seven-year period of our study. However, recent investigative journalism has shown that lobbying of senators by the oil

86 Mining Association of Canada, "Mining industry looks forward to participating in federal regulatory review," press release, June 20, 2016, <https://mining.ca/press-releases/mining-industry-looks-forward-to-participating-in-federal-regulatory-review/>.

87 Mining Association of Canada, "Mining industry responds to tabling of federal environmental legislation," press release, February 8, 2018, <http://mining.ca/news-events/press-releases/mining-industry-responds-tabling-federal-environmental-legislation>.

88 Mike De Souza, "Liberal ministers announce steps to fix Harper's environmental overhaul," National Observer, June 20, 2016, <https://www.nationalobserver.com/2016/06/20/news/liberal-ministers-announce-steps-fix-harpers-environmental-overhaul>.

89 Mike De Souza, "Trudeau Liberals propose sweeping reforms to Harper-era environmental laws," National Observer, June 29, 2017, <https://www.nationalobserver.com/2017/06/29/news/trudeau-liberals-propose-sweeping-reforms-environmental-laws>.

90 Gibson, "Assessment of Projects Would Improve Under Bill C-69."

91 Gibson.

92 Gilchrist, Emma. "'It's Appalling': Greens, NDP Oppose Federal Environmental Assessment Bill." *The Narwhal* (blog), June 21, 2018. <https://thenarwhal.ca/its-appalling-greens-ndp-oppose-federal-environmental-assessment-bill/>.

93 Fitzgerald, "Liberals Say #BetterRules. We Say We Need Better than That."

and gas industry intensified as Senate committees subsequently considered the bill. Following its review of the bill, on June 6, 2019, the Canadian Senate approved more than 180 amendments to Bill C-69. As Cox<sup>94</sup> reports, the wide-ranging legislative amendments closely mirror requests from the oil and gas industry, which had expressed widespread opposition to the original bill. From February 9, 2018 to June 6, 2019, CAPP lobbied senators 29 times on issues pertaining to the environment.<sup>95</sup> Included in CAPP's list of subjects of lobbying is a "grassroots lobbying campaign to ask Senators to make sure [Bill C-69] does not pass as it stands today."<sup>96</sup> An additional 16 companies and industry associations, including Enbridge, Imperial Oil, TransCanada and the Canadian Energy Pipeline Association, reported a total of 122 lobbying communications with senators from November 2018 to the end of April 2019.<sup>97</sup> In contrast ENGOs had 36 meetings.<sup>98</sup>

The intense lobbying of senators concerning Bill C-69 illustrates the strategically targeted character of industry lobbying, and lobbying windows. In 2016–17, organizations in our sample showed little interest in the Senate, logging a total of 10 contacts. But in 2018–19 big carbon saw an opportunity to block mild reforms to environmental assessment and its Senate lobbying went into overdrive.

In addition to these important policy frameworks, in the next section we train our attention on major pipeline companies and consider the intensity and timing of their lobbying in relation to major pipeline decisions and approvals.

## Lobbying and pipeline proposals and decisions

While TransCanada maintained high levels of lobbying throughout the period of our study, its efforts too have ebbed and flowed. In the first (truncated) interval of the study from January to November 2011, we saw particularly high levels of lobbying, which can be seen as a response by industry to Keystone XL pipeline developments (a pipeline to carry bitumen from Alberta to Texas). While the National Energy Board approved the pipeline in March 2010, extensive opposition to the pipeline south of the border began in late 2010 and early 2011 while the US state department extended its review of the project.<sup>99</sup> The pipeline was rejected by President Obama on January 18, 2012.

From January 2011 to January 2012, Keystone was the explicit subject of lobbying 33 times, with most meetings concerning "Discussions of the status, development and government's position with respect to the Keystone XL Pipeline Project." The targets of lobbying meanwhile indicate a concern to influence officials whose remit extends to foreign policy and affairs and who had reach into Washington: DPOHs at Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada were the target of meetings 16 times over that year, the PMO was lobbied nine times (seven of which were meetings with Dave Forestell, policy advisor to Harper) and three lobbying contacts were with Gary Doer, Canada's

The targets of lobbying indicate a concern to influence officials whose remit extends to foreign policy and affairs and who had reach into Washington.

94 Sarah Cox, "Senate Changes to Environmental Assessment Bill Are Worse than Harper-Era Legislation." The Narwhal, June 7, 2019, <https://thenarwhal.ca/senate-changes-to-environmental-assessment-bill-are-worse-than-harper-era-legislation-experts/>

95 Cox.

96 Sharon Riley and Sarah Cox, "Industry Responsible for 80 per Cent of Senate Lobbying Linked to Bill C-69." June 13, 2019, The Narwhal, <https://thenarwhal.ca/industry-responsible-for-80-per-cent-of-senate-lobbying-linked-to-bill-c-69/>

97 Cox.

98 Riley and Cox.

99 "A chronological history of controversial Keystone XL pipeline project," Canadian Press, January 24, 2017, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/keystone-xl-pipeline-timeline-1.3950156>.

then-ambassador to the US. According to Hudson and Friesen,<sup>100</sup> Ambassador Doer's "primary job was to sell the Keystone XL expansion to state governors and members of Congress"; i.e., Doer's main function in Washington was as a lobbyist for the government of Canada (and, indirectly, TransCanada). Although at lower volume, Keystone continued to be the subject matter given for lobbying by TransCanada. In addition, from its initial announcement in 2013 until its cancellation in October 2017 TransCanada's Energy East Pipeline was the subject of lobbying 50 times.

Enbridge is the sixth most active lobbyist in the sample. While maintaining a high volume of lobbying contacts, we witnessed a spike in its efforts from November 2012 to November 2013. The spike corresponds to the initial review processes surrounding its proposed Northern Gateway pipeline from the Alberta tar sands to the British Columbia coast (while also overlapping with an important lobbying window concerning changes to CEEA-2012). Enbridge's initial filing of an application for the pipeline took place on May 27, 2010, over a year before our study began. Cayley-Daoust and Girard<sup>101</sup> report a huge rise in lobbying contacts by Enbridge beginning at this time. A year and a half later, in January 2012, the review panel began a process of public hearings while the project faced intense public scrutiny and social movement opposition. In December 2013, a federal joint review panel released a report recommending approval of the pipeline.<sup>102</sup> The project was subsequently stalled through a series of federal court appeals and widespread opposition from First Nations whose territories would be impacted. In 2015, eight First Nations, four environmental groups and Canada's largest private sector union, UNIFOR, launched a joint case claiming that the federal environmental assessment had failed to consider threats to wildlife, oceans and Indigenous rights.<sup>103</sup> On November 29, 2016, the Trudeau government rejected the Northern Gateway application.

Kinder Morgan Canada emerged on the scene as a central lobbyist in 2012 and recorded especially high volumes of lobbying in 2013. The spike in lobbying corresponds to the initial proposal by Kinder Morgan to expand the Trans Mountain pipeline.

In the 13 months prior to the December 2013 approval, Enbridge recorded 185 lobbying contacts, by far the company's most intensive episode of lobbying over the seven-year period of our report. The next most active period of lobbying was in the lead-up to the 2016 decision. Despite lobbying 114 times in the 13 months prior to November 29, 2016, the pipeline was rejected. While rejecting the pipeline, Trudeau simultaneously gave the green light to Enbridge's Line 3 project—a replacement and expansion of a pipeline network that carries crude oil from Hardisty, Alberta to Superior, Wisconsin. The \$7.5-billion Line 3 replacement and expansion is the largest project in Enbridge's history.

As mentioned earlier, Kinder Morgan Canada emerged on the scene as a central lobbyist in 2012 and recorded especially high volumes of lobbying in 2013. The spike in lobbying corresponds to the initial proposal by Kinder Morgan to expand the Trans Mountain pipeline by "twinning" it with a second line roughly parallel to the existing one. In 2012, the company publicly announced its intentions to build the pipeline and in December 2013, filed an application with the NEB. The NEB eventually approved the pipeline, on May 29, 2016, while Prime Minister Justin Trudeau gave the green light on November 29, 2016.

In the lead-up to these 2016 decisions we find comparatively lower, but still extensive, lobbying contacts. In the year prior to Trudeau's announcement, Kinder Morgan Canada initiated 54 lobbying contacts with ministry representatives. The targets of these meetings include senior

100 Hudson and Friesen, "Finance, Fossil Fuels, and Climate Change."

101 Cayley-Daoust and Girard, "Big Oil's Oily Grasp: The Making of Canada as a Petro-State and How Oil Money Is Corrupting Canadian Politics."

102 "B.C.'s Northern Gateway pipeline," Canadian Press, 2013, <http://cponline.thecanadianpress.com/graphics/2013/northern-gateway-timeline/>.

103 Jason Procter. "Northern Gateway pipeline approval overturned" CBC News, June 30, 2016 <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/northern-gateway-pipeline-federal-court-of-appeal-1.3659561>.



**Table 5: Sample of reported lobbying topics from January 4, 2011 to January 30, 2018**

<b>Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Plan for Responsible Resource Development related to Bill C-38 (Part 3) plan to streamline the review process for major economic projects and the implementation thereof</li> <li>• Ministerial review of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act</li> <li>• National Energy Board related to a comprehensive review and modernization to ensure workability and practicality</li> </ul>
<b>Canadian Energy Pipeline Association</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Review of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act — as it relates to the assessment of energy pipeline projects</li> <li>• Canadian Environmental Assessment Act — participation in consultations to review and reform the Act</li> </ul>
<b>Mining Association of Canada</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Federal government’s energy strategy as it relates to oil sands mining</li> <li>• Corporate &amp; Social Responsibility &amp; Human Rights in respect to providing input into government regarding perspectives and best practices from mining industry</li> </ul>
<b>Suncor</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discussion with the federal government on its commitment to fully implement the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, including what that may mean from a consultation perspective, timelines</li> <li>• Discussion on any planned revisions to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, as committed to by the federal government</li> </ul>
<b>TransCanada</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To seek federal government support, or regulatory approvals from the National Energy Board for the construction, planning, execution and operations of TransCanada’s pipeline projects and other business interests</li> </ul>
<b>Enbridge</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National Energy Strategy — discussions regarding the development of a national energy strategy and the approach to opening new markets for natural resources</li> <li>• Discussions of the status, development and government’s position with respect Enbridge Projects</li> </ul>
<b>Canadian Gas Association</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Canadian Gas Association provides information on and suggests a more broad discussion on how to price carbon in the context of broad energy and environment policy</li> </ul>

policy advisors within the PMO, and ministers and chiefs of staff for Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Transport Canada, Environment and Climate Change Canada and Natural Resources Canada to provide various opportunities to garner favourable policy direction.

That the fix was in for the pipeline to proceed in advance of the official public approval was revealed by *National Observer* investigative journalist Mike De Souza.<sup>104</sup> Documents obtained through freedom of information as well as interviews with public officials allowed De Souza to reveal that at an internal government meeting in Vancouver on October 27—more than a month before the final decision on the pipeline was announced—Erin O’Gorman, associate deputy minister of natural resources, instructed government bureaucrats to “give cabinet a legally sound basis for saying ‘yes’” to the Trans Mountain project. In the meantime, Trudeau’s government continued to claim that they had yet to come to a final decision and were consulting in good faith with First Nations. As Gutstein<sup>105</sup> also reports, Kinder Morgan lobbied O’Gorman four times over the year, including one contact two weeks before the meeting in Vancouver, while her boss, deputy minister Bob Hamilton, was lobbied by the oil giant six times.

Table 5 provides a sample of lobbying topics that were reported as the “intended outcomes” of lobbying by some of the most active industry organizations.

104 Mike De Souza, “‘I was in shock,’ says government insider about instructions to ensure approval of Kinder Morgan pipeline,” *National Observer*, April 27, 2018, <https://www.nationalobserver.com/2018/04/27/news/i-was-shock-says-government-insider-about-instructions-ensure-approval-kinder-morgan>.

105 Gutstein, *The Big Stall*.

# Conclusion

The diminished role of members of Parliament as a focal governmental target under Trudeau, and the growing significance of senior public servants and mid-level staff within the former state agencies, indicate a strategy of targeting key decision-makers and state actors that remained after the change of government.

FROM JANUARY 4, 2011 TO JANUARY 30, 2018, 11,452 lobbying contacts (just over six contacts per working day) were recorded between the fossil fuel industry and federal government officials. The level of access to public office holders enjoyed by the industry is unparalleled. Oil and gas industry associations, which are central to the network of lobbyists, are far more active in lobbying federally than other resource and manufacturing associations while the amount of lobbying by environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOS) pales in comparison.

The bulk of these lobbying efforts, moreover, are carried out by a few large corporations (and industry associations representing the major players) that control much of this economic sector and therefore have the resources for permanent campaigns. The concentration in lobbying closely mirrors the ongoing concentration of fossil capital. Likewise, a handful of state organizations and state officials are the target of most lobbying by the fossil fuel industry. Therefore, the network, at its core, amounts to a “small world” of intense interaction among relatively few lobbyists/organizations and the designated public office holders in select centres of state power who are their targets.

In comparing lobbying across the Harper and Trudeau administrations, we found a pattern of continuity-in-change. Under Trudeau, the bulk of lobbying has been carried out by the same large firms as under Harper, while the lobbying network has become more focused on fewer state agencies with Natural Resources Canada and Environment Canada holding pride of place. The diminished role of members of Parliament as a focal governmental target under Trudeau, and the growing significance of senior public servants and mid-level staff within the former state agencies, indicate a strategy of targeting key decision-makers and state actors that remained after the change of government. This points to a “deep state,” a form of co-government, far outlasting election cycles whereby key state institutions and actors within them develop long-term relationships with leading corporations and private interests that contribute to strategy elaboration, policy formulation and implementation.<sup>106</sup>

Deep-state co-governance is clearly a departure from democratic practice. But it should not be seen as restricted to the fossil fuel lobby nor as a recently emergent phenomenon. In a late-1990s interview with Peter C. Newman, Tom D’Aquino, the long-serving CEO (1981–2009) of the Business Council of Canada (established in 1976), bragged about how the Council, through public-facing communication and private lobbying, took over the national political agenda:

<sup>106</sup> Lofgren, *The Deep State*; Taft, *Oil’s Deep State*.

*If you ask yourself, in which period since 1900 has Canada's business community had the most influence on public policy, I would say it was in the last twenty years. Look at what we stand for and look at what all the governments, all the major parties...have done and what they want to do. They have adopted the agendas we've been fighting for in the past two decades.<sup>107</sup>*

While it is not possible to determine the extent to which a given lobbying effort directly influences a specific policy outcome, our analysis shows the extent to which large, well-funded and well-organized corporations (and their industry associations) exert continual pressure on or work together with key decision makers to develop policies that align with their interests. In view of the past and continued close coupling of federal policy to the needs of extractive corporations, the lobbying efforts we have detailed appear to be highly successful.

Lobbying, as our report has confirmed, is continually dominated by wealthy and corporate interests and is conducted largely away from public view. As Brulle<sup>108</sup> suggests, "control over the nature and flow of information to government decision-makers can be significantly altered by the lobbying process, and creates a situation of systematically distorted communication." As lobbying creates elite networks of decision makers that exclude the general public, it runs counter to democracy.

However, lobbying can serve an earnest public interest: facilitating informed, public input into policymaking. Clearly, changes in how lobbying is regulated and the conduct of lobbyists are needed. While some recent improvements have been made to the federal Lobbying Act, the Act should be strengthened to close loopholes and enhance transparency.

As discussed above, among the major flaws in the current federal lobbyist registry is the absence of a requirement for lobbyists to divulge reasonably detailed information about their persuasive communications with state officials. Further, there is a lack of systematic recording of the actual lobbyists taking part in meetings/communications. More detailed descriptions concerning the nature of meetings between lobbyists and public office holders should therefore be available along with a date that connects that subject matter to a given meeting/communication. It should also be required that the name(s) of the actual lobbyist(s) involved in each meeting be recorded. And finally, disclosure of the costs of lobbying—fees paid to lobbyists by clients—should be reported as is done in the United States.

While such measures can help to bring lobbying more fully into public view (and in turn help limit the undue influence of private interests over public policy), policies are needed that go beyond increased transparency by proactively seeking to equalize opportunities for political influence. In this vein, Daub and Ejeckam,<sup>109</sup> advocate for increased support for what they call "public interest" or public advocacy lobbying. As an example of a public interest lobbyist, they point to the BC Office of the Seniors Advocate (BCOSA), which represents the interests of British Columbian seniors on issues of health care, housing, income, independence, transportation and mobility. As they explain, BCOSA is empowered to hire staff, retain experts and commission research, affording it vital capacities and resources to engage in lobbying that serves the public interest. As Daub and Ejeckam suggest, advocacy offices with similar powers to the BCOSA should be created but be dedicated to a range of issues such as poverty, housing insecurity and homelessness, the environment, students, people who use drugs and beyond. In this way, advocacy offices dealing

Lobbying is continually dominated by wealthy and corporate interests and is conducted largely away from public view.

107 Quoted in Newman, *Titans*, 159.

108 Brulle, "The Climate Lobby."

109 Daub and Ejeckam, *Fossil Fuel Industry Lobbying in BC* (working title, forthcoming).

Challenging these multiple modalities of corporate power and influence will be critical to the effort to transition away from fossil fuels in a rapid, democratic and socially just manner.

with a range of major issues and crises can help balance the “expert input” lobbying playing field, encouraging a more balanced flow of information to government decision makers.

In this report, we considered only one of the most direct and obvious means by which carbon corporations influence the political process. A full accounting would include tracking political party donations (which remain largely unregulated in Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan and the Yukon) and “revolving door” relations or close personal ties between the corporate community and various government departments, agencies, boards and commissions. The “direct” lobbying efforts we analyzed should also be understood as an important component of a broader elite “policy planning network.” The latter includes a wide range of business efforts to shape public and political perspective and opinion via corporate funded and directed think tanks, policy-planning organizations and grassroots campaigns. For example, the Business Council of Canada’s influence in shaping Canada’s climate strategy, including the “grand bargain” of acquiescing to a price on carbon on one side while building pipelines on the other, has been extensive.<sup>110</sup> Challenging these multiple modalities of corporate power and influence will be critical to the effort to transition away from fossil fuels in a rapid, democratic and socially just manner.

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110 See Gutstein, *The Big Stall*.

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## Appendix: Abbreviations for tables and figures

Acronym/Abbreviation	Category	Stands for
AAND	Federal institution	Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development
ACOA	Federal institution	Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency
AdamRyan	DPOH	Ryan Adam, Director of Issues Management, Natural Resources Canada (2015–2017), Prairies Regional Desk, Prime Minister's Office (2017–2018)
ADM	DPOH	Assistant Deputy Minister or Associate Assistant Deputy Minister
ALTAGAS	Industry lobbyist	AltaGas Ltd.
AMEBC	Industry lobbyist	Association for Mineral Exploration British Columbia
AnnesleyJanet	DPOH	Janet Annesley, Chief Of Staff, Office of the Minister of Natural Resources Canada
APACHE	Industry lobbyist	Apache Corp.
AroraAnil	DPOH	Anil Arora, Chief Statistician of Canada
ATCO	Industry lobbyist	ATCO Group
BC_LNG_A	Industry lobbyist	BC LNG Alliance
BCOSA	Federal institution	BC Office of the Seniors Advocate
BealeMike	DPOH	Mike Beale, Assistant Deputy Minister, Environment and Climate Change Canada
BenoitLeon	DPOH	Leon Benoit, Member of Parliament (Conservative Party)
Campbell-JarvisMarian	DPOH	Marian Campbell Jarvis, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Social Development Policy
Can Fuels Assn.	Industry lobbyist	Canadian Fuels Association
Can Gas Assn.	Industry lobbyist	Canadian Gas Association
Can Natural Res.	Industry lobbyist	Canadian Natural Resources Limited
CAN_EN_PL_A	Industry lobbyist	Canadian Energy Pipeline Association
CAN_FUELS_A	Industry lobbyist	Canadian Fuels Association
CAN_GAS_A	Industry lobbyist	Canadian Gas Association
CAN_NAT_RES	Industry lobbyist	Canadian Natural Resources Limited
CAODC	Industry lobbyist	Canadian Association of Oilwell Drilling Contractors
CAPP	Industry lobbyist	Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers
CarrJames	DPOH	James (Jim) Carr, Minister of Natural Resources (2015–2018)
CCEMC	Industry lobbyist	Climate Change and Emissions Management Corporation (known as Emissions Reduction Alberta)
CEAA	Federal institution	Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency
CENOVUS_EN	Industry lobbyist	Cenovus Energy
CEPA	Industry lobbyist	Canadian Energy Pipeline Association
CGA	Industry lobbyist	Canadian Gas Association
CHEVRON_CAN	Industry lobbyist	Chevron Canada
CitImmCan	Federal institution	Citizenship and Immigration Canada (now Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada)
CNRL	Industry lobbyist	Canadian Natural Resources Limited

COAL_A	Industry lobbyist	Coal Association of Canada
CommonsP	DPOH	House of Commons (Parliamentarian)
CommonsS	DPOH	House of Commons (Staff)
COP	Misc	Conference of the Parties (referring to the the parties of the 1992 Kyoto Protocol)
CoreyMark	DPOH	Mark Corey, Assistant Deputy Minister, Energy Sector, Department of Natural Resources
DCPC	DPOH	Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council
DFAITC	Federal institution	[Department of] Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada
DFO	Federal institution	[Department of] Fisheries and Oceans Canada
DM	DPOH	Deputy Minister
DND	Federal institution	Department of National Defence
DoerGary	DPOH	Gary Doer, Canadian Ambassador to the United States (2009–2016)
DPOH	Misc	Designated public office holder
DupontSerge	DPOH	Serge Dupont, Deputy Minister of Natural Resources (2010–2014)
EconDevCan	Federal institution	Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada
EMERA	Industry lobbyist	Emera Inc.
ENBRIDGE	Industry lobbyist	Enbridge Inc.
ENCANA	Industry lobbyist	Encana Corporation
ENGO	Misc	Environmental non-governmental organization
EnvirtCan	Federal institution	Environment and Climate Change Canada
ESDC	Federal institution	Employment and Social Development Canada
EXXON_CAN	Industry lobbyist	ExxonMobil Canada
FIN	Federal institution	Finance Canada
ForestellDave	DPOH	David Forestell, Policy Advisor and Staff Director, PMO (2009–2012), Chief of Staff to Minister of Natural Resources (2012–2013), Acting Executive Director and Senior Advisor to the Leader, Conservative Party of Canada (2013)
FORTIS	Industry lobbyist	Fortis Inc.
FORTUNE_MNRL	Industry lobbyist	Fortune Minerals Limited
GlobAffairs	Federal institution	Global Affairs Canada
HallmanRon	DPOH	Ron Hallman, ADM, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (2011) President, Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (2012–2018)
HamiltonBob	DPOH	Bob Hamilton, Deputy Minister of Natural Resources, Natural Resources Canada (2014–2016), Deputy Minister of the Environment, Environment Canada (2012–2014), Senior Associate Secretary of the Treasury Board and Lead on the Canada-United States Regulatory Cooperation Council (2011–2012)
HARVEST_OP	Industry lobbyist	Harvest Operations Corp.
HUSKY_EN	Industry lobbyist	Husky Energy Inc.
IMPERIAL_OIL	Industry lobbyist	Imperial Oil
INTER_PIPE2	Industry lobbyist	Inter Pipeline Fund
JenningsPhillip	DPOH	Philip Jennings, Associate Deputy Minister of Natural Resources (2016–2018)
JeppJon-Paul	DPOH	Jon-Paul Jepp, Senior Policy Advisor, Environment and Climate Change Canada (2015–2017)

JulienGuillaume	DPOH	Guillaume Julien, Senior Policy Advisor, Natural Resources Canada (2015–2019)
KeenanMichael	DPOH	Michael Keenan, Associate Deputy Minister of Natural Resources (2013–2016), Assistant Deputy Minister, Strategic Policy Branch, Environment Canada (2009–2013)
KenneyJason	DPOH	Jason Kenney, Minister of Employment and Social Development and Minister for Multiculturalism (2013–2015)
KentPeter	DPOH	Peter Kent, Minister of the Environment (2011–2013)
KhoslaJay	DPOH	Jay Khosla, Assistant Deputy Minister, Energy Sector, Natural Resources Canada
KINDER_MORG	Industry lobbyist	Kinder Morgan Canada Limited
LNG	Misc	Liquefied natural gas
LONE_PINE	Industry lobbyist	Lone Pine Resources Canada Ltd. (now Prairie Provident Resources Inc.)
LucasStephen	DPOH	Stephen Lucas, Senior Associate Deputy Minister, Climate Change, Environment and Climate Change (2016–present)
MAC	Industry lobbyist	Mining Association of Canada
MaksymetzRichard	DPOH	Richard Maksymetz, Chief of Staff, Finance Canada (2015–2018)
McArthurDavid	DPOH	David McArthur, Chief of Staff / Senior Special Assistant, Minister's Offices at Natural Resources Canada, Minister of Heritage and Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development (2009–2015)
McCormickJesse	DPOH	Jesse McCormick, Director of Policy and Indigenous Relations, Office of the Minister of Environment and Climate Change (2017–present), Director of Indigenous Relations and Regulatory Affairs, Office of the Minister of Environment and Climate Change (2016)
McFarlaneGreg	DPOH	Greg McFarlane, Policy Advisor, PMO (2012–2014), Chief of Staff, Office of the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development (2014–2015)
McKennaCatherine	DPOH	Catherine McKenna, Minister of Environment and Climate Change (2015–present)
MIN_A_CAN	Industry lobbyist	Mining Association of Canada
MP	DPOH	Member of Parliament
NEB	Federal institution	National Energy Board
NEXEN	Industry lobbyist	Nexen Inc. (now part of CNOOC Petroleum North America ULC)
NRCan	Federal institution	Natural Resources Canada
OliverJoe	DPOH	Joe Oliver, Minister of Natural Resources (2011–2014)
PCO	Federal institution	Privy Council Office
PETE_SERV_A	Industry lobbyist	Petroleum Services Association of Canada
PMO	Federal institution	Prime Minister's Office
PraughtChristopher	DPOH	Christopher Praught, Senior Policy and Regional Affairs Advisor, Natural Resources Canada (2012–2015)
PROGRESS_EN	Industry lobbyist	Progress Energy Inc. (now PETRONAS Canada)
PubWorks	Federal institution	Public Works and Government Services Canada (now Public Services and Procurement Canada)
RajotteJames	DPOH	James Rajotte, Member of Parliament for Edmonton—Leduc (2000–2015)
RauMichael	DPOH	Mike Rau, Natural Resources Canada (and various positions since 2006, including Director of Policy to the Minister of Natural Resources 2016–2018)
RaynoldsMarlo	DPOH	Chief of Staff, Environment and Climate Change Canada (2015–present)
RempelMichelle	DPOH	Minister of State, Western Economic Diversification (2013–2015), Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of the Environment (2011–2013)

RuddKim	DPOH	Kim Rudd, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Natural Resources (2015–2018)
Senate	Federal institution	Senate of Canada
SHELL_CAN	Industry lobbyist	Shell Canada Limited
SHERRITT_INT	Industry lobbyist	Sherritt International
SmithHeather	DPOH	Heather Smith, Vice President Operations, Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency
SUNCOR_EN	Industry lobbyist	Suncor Energy
SYNCRUDE_CAN	Industry lobbyist	Syncrude Canada Ltd.
TALISMAN_EN	Industry lobbyist	Talisman Energy Inc. (bought out by Repsol S.A.)
TC	Federal institution	Transport Canada
TECK_RES	Industry lobbyist	Teck Resources Limited
TMX	Misc	Trans Mountain Pipeline Expansion
TRANSALTA	Industry lobbyist	TransAlta Corporation
TRANSCAN	Industry lobbyist	TransCanada Corporation
TremblayChristyne	DPOH	Christyne Tremblay, Deputy Minister, Natural Resources Canada (2016–present)
UNDRIP	Misc	United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
UNION_GAS	Industry lobbyist	Union Gas Limited
VolkColeen	DPOH	Coleen Volk, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet, PCO (2013–2016), Assistant Deputy Minister, Environmental Stewardship Branch, Environment Canada (2011–2013)
WD	Federal institution	Western Economic Diversification Canada
WESTCOAST_EN	Industry lobbyist	Westcoast Energy Inc.
WilkinsonJonathan	DPOH	Jonathan Wilkinson, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Environment and Climate Change (2015–2018)







This report is part of the Corporate Mapping Project (CMP), a research and public engagement initiative investigating the power of the fossil fuel industry. The CMP is jointly led by the University of Victoria, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives BC and Saskatchewan Offices, and Parkland Institute. The initiative is a partnership of academic and community-based researchers and advisors who share a commitment to advancing reliable knowledge that supports citizen action and transparent public policy making. This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).

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The Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives is an independent, non-partisan research institute concerned with issues of social, economic and environmental justice. Founded in 1980, it is one of Canada's leading progressive voices in public policy debates.

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living wage  
employer